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Investigation and examination of some American
attitudes to the Soviet Union, like all attitudinal studies,
pose severe problems

for the historian. First, it is

difficult to identify members of the business and banking

community in any detail, because of the anonimity of much
of the source material. It is also difficult to determine

how representative were the viev;s expressed, or if certain
groups of businessmen preferred one kind of action to
another. Even Profesbor Filene, by analyzing the "opinions

and attitudes only of those

who made their views known"

does not solve the identity problem.^ Many views on the

Soviet Union were anonymously expressed or reported in a

business paper like the

Street Journal

V/9,11

2
*

making it

hard to determine whether these were the opinions of the
reporter, editor or editorial board. How many of the news-

paper's readers shared these views? Were the readers all

businessmen? These remain insoluble

problems for the

present, since it has been impossible to locate distributJ.on figures for the Journal

1.

Filene. A mericans and the SQViet.J5:xP_gJ:iiinj£ILfc»
Harvard University Press,
1Q17-1933 (Cambridge, Mass.,
1967. ) p. 3.
Hereafter referred to as " Journal " in the text.
P^^tfir g.

.

2.

.

t

Despite these difficulties, and the obvious

limitations inherent in this approach, it is possible
to identify one influential group of American business-

men.

These were the "big businessmen", the leaders of

commercial and financial concerns that either had been

connected with the pre-revolutionary Russia or hoped to

develop trade relations with the Soviet Union. Many of
these firms and financial houses possessed branch offices

or headquarters in New York City, were members of various

American-Soviet trade organisations, which were also
based in New York, and were deeply involved with Wall
Street. Other firms, in and out of the Northeast, which

traded with the Soviet Union were also linked to New York,
since they too had to make contracts through the American-

Soviet trade organisations mentioned above. In light of
this it seemed logical to concentrate on two business
organs, namely, the Wall Street Journal

Times

.

,

and the NgW YQtbL

The former is particularly stressed, because of its

wide daily coverage of specific business and financial news.
It is also one significant source apparently not dealt

with systematically by Professors Lovenstein and Filene,
in their respective studies of Americaji attitudes to

3

the Soviet Union.

Two aspects intrigued me in my examination of
the ilg,yrnal.

First,

the immediate American business

reaction to both revolutions, and second the part played
by Aratorg, the trading corporation with headquarters
in

New York, in moulding
addition,

I

v/as

American business opinion. In

interested in discovering how deeply the

widespread anti-Soviet feeling of the 1920 's affected busi-

nessmen and bankers. To

v/hat

extent were they influenced

by the political strictures of successive antxSoviet
adiTiinistrations? Kow did their fears,

if they had any,

affect their business transactions? What were their reactions to the Soviet Five Year Plans? Is there any evidence
to show that this business interest group,

particularly in New York and more generally

situated
,

in the North-

east, exerted direct pressure on President Roosevelt for

recognition of the Soviet Union? To

v/hat

extent wore

American businessmen anti-communist? The main events of
Soviet history from I917 to 1933» and American business

reaction to them, from which the above

3.

Meno. Lovenstein,

questions arise.

^nprj^cy^n O pinion of S ovi et

Russia

*

(Wash»,D.C.,

American Council on Public Affairs, 19^t).
Peter G. Filene, Americans and the Soviet T^xpe rimgnti 1•9171933 . (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967).

will be examined in chronological order.

.

5

Chapter

li

Banking and Eusiners

to tho twQ.

»tt,lt,i;|rif^s

Ruf^sian RevQl\3t jjo^??!
I

»

Bankers

What was the banking cominunity'

s

immediate and

spontaneous response to the actual events of the Russian

Revolution? Surprisingly, neither Meno Lovenstein nor

Peter Filene deal precisely with this question. Yet
investigation of the response reveals how poorly
acquainted American bankers (and businessmen) often were
with internal Russian affairs. Misconceptions formed

during this period had a telling effect on later trade
relations with the Soviet Union.
Initially,

,

Russian involvement in the 191^-1918

war was the main concern of American bankers. Internal
Russian disorders were overlooked or were incomprehensible.

When it became obvious that something more than street
rioting

v;as

in progress in Russia, no one was easily able

to guage the situation accurately, partly from lack of

knowledge, partly from the speed of events.

First reports of the March revolution of 1917

understandably stirred Wall Street and the ^guyn^X reported
that at 1.30 p.m., when news of the Petrograd revolution

came over the tickers, all trading on the floor
of the
houfjo came

to an abrupt halt.

At the time, general Wall

Street opinion was that the disorderj? in Russia
were,

mainly expressions of disgust at the supposed proGerman tendencies of the Tzarist government,^ Affairs
on the market coon returned to normal however, since

banking circles placidly regarded the overthrow of the
autocracy and the eventual emergence oF the Provisional
government under Prince George Lvov as a positive aid
to

the allies' cause.

It was further thought that the

RuGsians had finally demonstrated their discontent with

Tzarist corruption and inefficiency and were paving the

way for the establishment of a stable, liberal government.'^
A pessimistic note was sounded by those bankers who

feared lest the new Russian administration be socialist
in its philosophy.

They regardbd with suspicion the inclus-

ion of the socialist deputy, Alexander Kerensky, as

Minister of Justice. Initially, the alarm felt by American
financiers did not go very deep even though some were
aware of the prevalence of socialist thinking in some sectors

of Russian society.
One banker, obviously cognisant with Marxian

^.
5.

Wall St reet Journ al. March l6, 1917 (Hereafter, WSJ
March 17, 1917.

)

7

theory, explained that Russia had to go through the

three classsic stages before it could becoine a socialist
state. He emphatically

stated that the first, if any,

change in Russia would be towards a limited monarchy as
in England, v/here order and property rights were still

respected. On this basis, he confidently regarded American

war loans to Russia as the safest made to any foreign

country.^ Another optimistic banker predicted increased

American trade and financial business
the war.

v;ith

Russia after

Claiming to speak for New York bankers generally,

he intimated that they believed that no Russian abrogation

of debts or contracts would occur.

simply be dismissed
the, tirT\e,i"iP0

n

These views cannot

as shortsighted. First,. it Wa'^, at^

2sible to analyse their full significance

for the banking community. Second, the marked distrust
and fear of "socialism" reflected

the prevalent

establishment attitude of the period. Third, an emphatic
rule of

r.ny

banking or business group is to avoid over-

reaction to events as chaotic and perplexing as these,
lest unnecessary financial panic occur, resulting in
loss and confusion.

March 17, 1917

6.
7.

liiil.

The political structure of Russia underwent

severe changes from March to May 191?. Supreme power

eventually rested

v/ith the

Provisional government, after

Grand Duke Michael had refused to undertake the task of
government. Conflicting opinions over Russia's continued

participation in the

v/ar

gave rise to a new cabinet on

May 17, 191?. Foreign Minister Paul Miliukov, representing
moderate elements

v;ho

v/anted to continue the war to a

victorious conclusion was forced to resign. The effective

leader of the new government was the socialist Kerensky,
ministei^ of "both v;ar and marine.

Increasingly, perplexity

and anxiety tinged the optimism of American bankers in the

eventual emergence of democratic governmental forms in Russia.

Few were as honest as one banker who admitted
that no one really knew what was going to happen in Russia.

g

Since this was the case with many banking leaders, they
took what comfort they could from their own hesitant and

often superficial analyses of the revolution's progress.

Even the honest banker above mentioned succumbed to the
held

belief in American financial circles, that the

Russian situation was not entirely hopeless. And even
8.

WSJ. May 7, 1917.

widely

-9-

if the internal Russian situation was serious, it was

considered that these radical changes were transient
phenomena. Hopefully, "time" would erase what an anonym-

ous group of Boston and New York bankers called an "excess
of radicalism." Sounding remarkably like authors of a

twentieth century version of the Federalist Papers , they

continued that it was "...a dangerous thing to give great

masses of mankind too much liberty all in one

lump dose,"

especially since liberty often "degenerated into licence."
Piously, they recommended the "education of the masses of
tiie

people into the use of liberty with restraint."

g
^

To

another outspoken New York banker, it was "beyond belief"
that men like Prince Lvov would be unable to hold the reins
of

pov,'er

and restore order and stability,

This "belief"

v/as

subsequently shattered by the

BolEhevik coup d'etat on October 25» 1917t and the collapse
of the Provisional Government (by that time led by Kerensky).
It was several months, however, before the significance

of the change in Russian leadership was fully comprehended
of
by American financiers. The American-Russian Chamber

Commerce even felt confident enough to affirm, on the
that the
eve of a $100,000,000 American loan to Russia,

9. -Iliid.

10. iMii.

that the United States was "in a position to be of the

greatest assistance to Russia," through loans and investment of private capital in Russian industrial development.
This statement

hints at the prevailing American myth,

to be developed later,

of a potentially vast, virtually

untapped Russian market waiting to be exploited by those
with capital and technical know-how. Another popular

financial attitude reveals exactly how idealistically
the Russian revolution could be contemplated.

Bankers

looked back into America's collective experience for
comparable situations and one of them openly likened

Russian events to the American revolution of 1776.
Since ho also implied the possibility of similar results,
he asserted that Russia was better security for a loan

than America had been 140 years earlier. Neatly summing

up this belief in a "Russian revolution for independence,
he ingenuously asked,

"what is $100,000,000 to the

United States to be spent, however blindly, to help
a sister republic fight for Democracy?"

12

Perhaps this "blindness" was regretted a year
later, when Russia withdrew from World War

11.
12.

V/M. May 1917.
liiiii.

I

and the

-11-

Bolshevik determination to retain power was revealed
during a period of bitter Civil

V/ar,

The possibility

of a peace treaty between Russia and Germany irritated

American bankers and

a constant source of worry.

v/as

Prominence was given in business publications to

Trotsky^s negotiations with Germany and to the Treaty
of Brest-Litovsk (which made peace between Russia and

Germany an actuality) v;hich was signed March 3rd, I9I8.

Irritation

v/ith

Germany also developed out of American

envy of the former country's attempts at greater economic
links with Russia. Ever present also was American fear
of German exploitation of Russian markets in which

American banlcers and businessmen expected to take first
place.

To be sure,

this fixation with Germany did not

only stem from American disapprobation at Russian-German
peace moves. From I89O till 191^ Germany had been the

largest market

fcxT

Russian food and raw and semi-manuin turn- sold Russia 75^ of all

factured goods. Germany

,

its metal ores and over

505^

of all textile materials.

13

American attitudes therefore, were conditioned by desire
to limit German economic competition.

13. R. P. Fisher,

"Germany's hand

"Am-rican Investip.onts in r^^-Sovist Russir."

-12-

closing on Siberian gold." and"Must save Russian
banks
from Germany," were samples of headlines
from the Journal
for I9I8. In the account which followed the
first of

these

headlines, Russia was portrayed as being completely
in
Germany's exploitative graspt it was also feared
that the

war would be prolonged

if Germany had access to Russian

gold, "thus causing a price decline.

The awesome consequence

would have Germany in control of the "vast resources
in
Asia" ready for another struggle, while the United States

would be plunged into

debt."''^

The Bolshevik plan to nationalise the banks

also produced American consternation. Frederick

M.

Corse,

General Manager of the New York Life Insurance Company
in Russia, reported the fate of the private Volga Kama
bank.

According to Corse, Russian government officials

had deposed the president of the bank and replaced him

with the "rear yard man.

"

All private banks, he predicted,

would share a similar fate.

1

Not only was nationalization

alien to American economic concepts, but it augured badly
for American hopes of exploiting the rich Russian market,
which they had assured themselves existed. Implicit in this

1^.
15.

KM.

July

iiSJ,

Dec.

I9I8.
20, I9I8.
1,

-13-

statement was the view that America should assume the

superior role.
The jlaiicnolf in sum, presented a predictable

picture, given the underlying concepts of American

business.

There were no surprises. Bankers changed their

attitudes as the Russian revolution changed its direction.
The March uprising had had promising beginnings! the

auotcracy had been threatened and was eventually toppled;
the path towards

democracy seemed unimpeded. The

emergence of an aggressive Bolshevism not only shocked
bankers* democratic sensibilities, it also made them

more acutely

av.-are

of additional and peripheral dangers,

of v/hich the economic throat of Germany was a case in point.

Whether or not Germany, having been badly mauled by

v/ar

and left v/ith a shaky economy, was an immediate menace
to American economic interests in Russia was unimportant

for these purposes. American bankers thought the Imperial
Reich possessed the potential to harm them, and viewed
its relations with both countries in that light.

II.

Mains-SxiEisii..

Businessmen, like their banking compatriots,
were concerned with the results of both Russian revolutions, and they responded with a similar cautious optimism.

Somo buoinecG concerns lont no time in revealing
their

feelings regarding; the March revolution. On March 2l8t,
the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce cabled its

opposite number in Moscow and the American embaony in
Petrograd, expressing its cympathy and extending its

goodwill to the Russian government. Then followed what
was to be a recurrent theme in business thoughti an

explanation of the benefits which would accrue to the
United States from continued economic contact
Russia.

v/ith

Businessmen exuded an unabashed confidence in

the beneficial effects their proposed trading contacts

would have on Russia's own development. They showed

almost no appreciation of the possible effects that
the March and subsequent uprisings would have on the

political and economic life of that country. For example,
tho American-Russian Chamber of Commerce, convinced that

events in Russia v;ould benefit American interests, claimed
that the "Liberal forces in Russia represented the bulk

of the Russian people and are in close sympathy with the
aims of the United States," The Chamber fully anticipated
that the new Russian government would welcome American
fcapital and enterprise to assist post-war reconstruction.

-15-

This was one of the more potent of the prevailing busi-

ness attitudes and remained so until the intentions of
the Bolaheviks were made painfully clear to Americans.

An example of American economic involvement
at the time of the first revolution, was Russian war
orders. Naturally, businessmen were concerned with the

effects of the revolution on the latter. The Journ?^!
at first reflected the cautious optimism previously

mentionedi in an immediate reaction, a correspondent

considered the economic and trading outlook was favorable, but warned that it was too early to make definite

statements. Despite this and similar cautions, Americans

were confident in their

ov/n

ability to maintain Russian

war orders, and consequently there were frequent reports
of such transactions in the Journal

.

One such report

explained that the main commodities Russia needed for use
in the war were locomotives for transportation and shells^

for ammunition. Included in one order, the report
continued, was a contract assigning 150 locomotive engines

each to the Baldv/in and American Locom.otive Companies,
the total cost of which amounted to $11,100,000. Neither

firm was said to fear cancellation of the orders by the
16.

Vf^J.

March 21, 1917.

-16-

new Russian governinent. Total American
shell orders for
the Russian army exceeded $200,000,000.
The Journal
also optimistically stated that several
firms would
benefit from the removal of previous
Russian
shell

inspection difficulties and from the freeing
of working
capital tied up in Russian contracts. One
such American
company, Bethlehem Steel, was already profiting
from

such a movement- of capital.

"^"^

Finally, as if to justify the iLoiimalla

^

confident prediction of favorable and beneficial trade

relations for the United States, a new agreement was
signed in April, I917, for shell parts. The two companies

involved were General Electric which gained $9,000,000
and American Can which gained $5,000,000

capital from this contract.

in working

The Journal interpreted this

Russian eagerness for economic agreements as indicative
of a desire to fight a successful war, something which
had

previously seemed doubtful.

1 ft

Since the major

European countries were concerned with

the depleting

task of fighting each other, America became Russia's

chief source

for

v/ar

material. American businessmen

March 20, 1917. Other concerns interested in the
shell contracts were American Can, General Electric,
Bartlett-Hayward, International Steel and Ordnance, and
International Steam Pump Companies. A rifle contract with
Russia was also obtained by Westinghouse Electric and
Manufacturing Company.
18. WSJ, April 3, 1917.

!?•

liSsIt

17

were porcuaded that their own analysis was right and pointed
to the phenomenal rise in exports to Russia as

proof

not only of her desire to win, but also of her wish to
extend her markets. 19" Naturally, much of this Russian desire
was engendered by a war-time need for arms, ammunition
and other manufactured goods.

It did however, encourage

businessmen to predict, even on this basis, increased
American-Russian trade after the war haa ended and the
Russian internal situation had resolved itself.
Transportation was another important area of
the Russian v/ar effort and once more American businessmen

played a vital role. In May 1917» Daniel Willard, president
of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and chairman of the ad-

visory board of the Council of National Defence, announced
that a railroad commission was being formed at the request
of the Russian government.

20

Two American businesses,

namely, American Car and Foundry and Standard Steel Car

companies quickly found themselves with orders for 6,500
and 3,500 engines respectively.

21

The March revolution, therefore, in its first

impact on American business, left the solid economic
19.

March 21, 1917- Exports to Russia from U.S.A. had
risen from a 1915 total of $170,000,000 to $^69,000,000

V/SJ ,

in 1916.
20.
21.

1917.
May
May 30, 1917
iiiiJ:,

W^liI,

-18-

foundation formed by war virtually untouched.
Initially,

businessmen regarded the Russian situation as a
temporary
phenomena. The latter would not last, they
imaginedi.
a

responsible, democratic government was sure to
take over,
now that Tzarist tyranny had been effectively
overthrovm.

With hindsight, this may seem to us a naive outlook.
But
the businessman generally left politics to the
politician,

and only considered the violent interhal Russian events in
the context of trade, which, after all, was his primary

concern.

This attitude was reflected in the Journal

On the one hand, disgust

.

was expressed at the "socialist

menace" prevalent in Russiai 22 on the other, business

fears were temporarily assuaged by the report that Russia's

commercial dependence would continue.
There was no discussion of the reports of the

Bolshevik revolution in the Journa l and the drama of the
cQun d'etat was completely overlooked. Contracts, contacts
and profits v;ere understandably uppermost in the business-

man's mind. For example, Kerensky*

s

overthrow brought

nothing more than a notice of a New England shoe manufacturer's opening bids for 3,300,000 pairs of shoes for Russia.
Similarly, businessmen were relieved to learn that the

22.
23.
24.

WSjI,

June 16, I917.
Oct. 8, 1917

liSil,

Nov.

WSJt

13,

1917.

2^

ft

-19-

November 191? contracts for 648 engines and 30,000 cars,
divided between American Car and Foundry, Standard Steel
Car, Pressed Steol and Pacific Car companies, remained

intact.

Businessmen ignored the political arena and

concentrated all their energies on the lucrative Russian
trade.

They were justified in so doing. Figures compiled

by th6 National City Bank of New York revealed that export
values from 191^-1917 equalled the total for the 50

preceding years, which was

estimated at $1,000,000,000.

The Journal also supplied its own figures for the years

1900-1917* which amply show the steady rise in value of

American exports to Russia.
during the years I916-I9I7

27

The phenomenal rise in value

v/as

obviously caused by the

many large Russian war orders.
The

belief that Bolshevik rule ,( imperfectly

understood by the American business community) would be
shortlived, persisted for several years, but was at its

most potent from I917-I9I8.
Russia, engendered by the

v;ar

The chaotic situation in

and revolutions, famine

and food shortage, and the discontent bred from years

of privation made this attitude seem plausible at the time

25.
26.
27.

WS.J,

WSJf
iiiii,

22, 1917.
June 26, 1917.
Sept. 11, 1917.

Nov.

K
For list of figures, see Appendix A
,

,

-20-

One article in the Journ?i l for December, I917, bore the

heading "Revolution in Russia based on food shortage."
There followed a brief report from

J.

Ralph Pichell,-

secretary of the Council of Grain Exchanges. In his
opinion, Kerensky's overthrow had been due to his gross

ineptitude in handling food supplies. It was therefore
inevitable, continued Pichell, that Kerensky v/ould be

supplanted and that the Bolsheviks would assume "temporary
power.

28
"

Comments and reports in the Journ al made

frequent mention of the supposed transient nature of
the Bolf'hovik government. One such editorial, headed

"An awakening Giant" stressed that Russia was becoming

a"tremendous force for good" and would continue along
this path "if rightly directed." Russia, advised the

editor of the Journal

,

needed "sympathy and understanding."

He felt that, despite the fact that Russia's governmental experiments seemed to reveal socialist tendencies,

"ultimalaly" the new system would "reflect the true
spirit of the Russian people."

Although not stated,

the inference was that the "true spirit" would not be

socialistic. A report in the Jo yrnal for late November,

28.
29.

WSJ. Dec.
mi, Nov.

14,
10,

1917.
1917.

21

1917 further illustrated the optimism expressed by busi-

nessmen over the Russian situation. In an article

enumerating the recent American-Russian contracts, the
writer revealed that traders believed the Russian upheavals to be only "temporary" and that "responsible
government" would shortly assume control.

Discovering that Bolshevism was not to be
easily ousted from power, the Journal predictably
revealed hardened attitudes as former expressions of

optimism swiftly disappeared. When the communist aims
of the new Russian leaders, particularly Lenin, became

more widely known, business leaders grew alarmed. The

chilling prospect of having their financial investments
and commercial contracts placed in immediate and constant

jeopardy made the Russian revolutionaries look like

descendants of Machiavelli. Numerous diatribes appeared
in the Journal, directed mainly at Trotsky, possibly

because of his former American connections. This "archvillain" was compared to Judas Iscariot, accused of

demoralising the Russian army, and condemned as the
Kaiser's agent. Far from sympathising with the revolut-

22

ions in Russia at this juncture,
the Journal abandoned
all attempts to view the revolutions
in a favorable

light and countenanced a return to autocracy
as the
only way to restore orderly government.
The fear of German exploitation of Russian

resources bothered businessmen as it had done
bankers,
and acquired an even more serious nature as the details
of Bolshevik government became clearer. Now it seemed
to businessmen,

the United States had the dual task of

saving Russia from herself and from Germany. A I9I8 June

editorial exhorted

the American government to donate

money and lend moral support, while Japan supplied the
32
manpower.-^

Ominous reports of the fate of existing

American trading ventures in Russia further dampened
the commercially acquisitive spirit, formerly heart-

ened by the overthrow of the autocracy. The fate of

thriving Russian banking and financial concerns was

now mirrored by that of American firms. Made prosperous
during the early war years, they were now beginning to
suffer at the collectivising hands of the revolutionaries.
The Journal reported that the Submarine Boat Corporation

31.
32.

mi% May
WSJ,

I9I8.
June 20, I9I6.
3t

23

was disintegrating, following Russian v/ithdrawal from the

war front. Similarly, Bethlehem Steel, Midvale Steel
Corporation, Westinghouse, Remington Arms, National

City Bank and others, had lost capital and profits.
Despite these initial setbacks, some business-

men eagerly accepted the legend of the vast potential
of the Russian market. Since the situation in post-

war Russia made it often difficult for business, representatives to obtain first hand information^ almost anyone
who returned to comment on the Soviet scene was regarded

with interest and was heard attentively. One such source.

Sterling

H.

Brunnell, a New York engineer, writing (in

the American Machinist ) on the Russian need for agricultural

tools and machinery, gave further credence to the legend.
A great opportunity for trade now existed for American

machinery manufacturers, he maintained. It was unthinkable,
he continued, that American businessmen should allow

Germany to exploit Russia's raw materials and markets.
Brunnell described the precise nature of the latter, thus

giving businessmen an idea of what they could expect to find.
The most desirable commodities offered by Russia were, in

33.
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his opinion, hnr vast quantities of raw materials— hides,
flax, furs, minerals and agricultural products.

There was

nothing new about this information, yet Brunnell's reiteration of it at this time is typical of those who argued
for immediate American commercial intervention in Russia.

Brunnell pointed out that Americaii interests would benefit
since- there was a shortage of these raw materials in the

United States. Benefits would be reciprocal, however,
and Russia needed all the assistance she could get, since
she faced famine, an aftermath of war and internal upheaval.

Brunnell therefore urged businessmen to make trading

arrangements so that Russian materials could be exported
to,

and sold in, America, and that the dollars Russia

obtained could then be used to buy its much needed
machinery.-"^

Edward

N.

Businessmen were assailed from all sidos»

Hurley, chairman of the U.S.

Shipping Board,

strongly urged the Illinois Manufacturers

Association

to look for a"world market" after the war.

It is highly

possible that Soviet Russia was in his thoughts.

35
-^^

American-Russian Chamber of Commerce also took part

The

in

building up the hopes of businessmen. It boldly declared
Di.^es t* April 16,
June 29. 1918.

3^.
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that there was a market in the United States for $60,000,000
to $75tOOO,000 worth of Russian raw materials.

Thus,

the viev/s of men like Sterling Brunnell received official

approval. Although businessmen and coranentators

v/ere

aware of the benofits American trade v;ould have for Russia,
this was more often implicitly understood than expressly
stated. While there is nothing unusual in this response,

one might have expected more awareness of the difficulties

of capitalist trade with a communist country. But then,

businessmen daily
ajid

expected the overthrow

of the Bolsheviks

the return of "responsible" government.

This accelerated interest in Soviet Russia

penetrated the administration and reached presidential
level. A Russian bureau was formed in the United States

called the "War Trade Board of the United States Russian
Bureau." Organised at the behest of the President, its
purpose was to enable the Russians to gain their own

economic stability. It was quite separate from the American

Relief Administration, which, under the direction of Herbert
Hoover, coordinated American efforts to ease the plight of

many starving Russians. The Russian bureau had a capital
36.
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stock of $5,000,000, cvmed and issued by the United States

government. Its specific task was to assist in the export

of agricultural implements, shoes and clothing to Russia
and Siberia. Renewed trading opportunities for American.

firms and the possibilities of obtaining

rav;

materials

37

were to be America's rev/ard.^' Although the intention

of such a bureau was not solely philanthropic, this

bureau and the American Relief Administration were

welcomed as humane examples of the potentialities of

capitalism in contradistinction to soviet techniques.
To say that the business community of the

American Northeast possessed little accurate knowledge
of the revolutions in Russia, or could have satisfactorily

guaged their outcome, is to say very little. Businessmen
were not alone in their hope and belief that the Soviet

regime would be short-livedt most of Western Europe held

similar views in 1918. American businessmen, while deploring Soviet policies, continued to seek the profitable

Russian markets which had become part of the commercially
attractive "conventional wisdom" of the time. Businessmen

37.
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were not totally unroaliGtic. They know that the
profitable incrcaEG in U.S.-Runaian trade had come mainly

from enormous

v;ar

to capitalise

(literally and figurately) on contacts

orders. NevcrtholGcs, thoy intended

and connections already established.
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It may ceem

a tran,^e

to

include opinionc

from a 'non-businessman' in the strict sense of the word
but it -was done for several reasons. First, most busines

men and bankers remain anonymous over their attitudes to

Sociot Union. Business and banking; opinion in general
was therofor(» recorded by newspaper editors, like that
of the V/pll Strg et Jo urnal, William Peter Hamilton.
His editorials

r;ive

the impression that they were com-

posed not only for the benefit of the bip businessmen,

but also for lessor business

lif?;lits

who were interested

and involved in the financial worJd of Wall Street.

Thus

his editorials were often blunt and direct, couched in

non-commercial
stand.

languafi;e,

so that everyone could under-

Such importance did he hold amonp; the Journn l *s

staff as their editor-in-chief, that an unprecedented
three columns of an inside

raphical comments.

Thomas

H.

-^^

1VSJ[,

v/ere

devoted to biog-

Durin^^ the interview,

conducted by

Ormsby, Mr. Hamilton discussed his projected

role for the Journal

38.

paf?;e

Sept. 12,

t

although he did not make specific

1922.

29

reference here to the Soviet Union, knowledge of the
aims
and attitudes he brought to bear on his editorial
subjects

helps clarify his later opinions.

Hamilton was fully acquainted with the business
world, having been

formerly an office-boy to a London

stockbroker, before moving into financial journalism in

America as editor of the Jsnmait on January

1,

1908.

V/riting, he commented,

interested him more than" stock-

broking and clerking."

This experience, however,

afforded him an opportunity to

loam

from the inside the

workings and fluctuations of the Stock market. Before

coming to America, ho travelled widely and remarked
the business genius

of..

on

the late J.Pierpont Morgan. Only

one other man in his opinion, approached Morgan for

"intuitive intelligence", and that was Cecil Rhodes,
whose "definite ideas and large concepts" were "far
above the mere making of money.

"

He arrived in the

United States at the outbreak of the Boer War, on the

invitation of Thomas

F.

Woodlock, a partner of Dow, Jones

and Company, owners of the Wall Street Journal

duties were to keep

39.
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Hamilton's

Street accurately informed about

>
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the Boer'V/ar»s progress and "its market importance"

His commentaries during 1919-1922 on U.S. -Soviet political
and economic relations probably had a similar aim. Kov/ever,

his Boer War reports did not consume all his time, and so
he invented for the Dow- Jones Financial News Service, the

Stock Market paragraphs f which were speedily incorporated
as a standing feature of the Service and of the Wall Street

Journal. Hamilton maintained that his information helped

active brokerage firms and sustained interest in the
market. He then spoke of the close working relationship

which had existed for tv;enty years between him and the

proprietor of the Journal
a frequent contributor.

#

Clarence

W.

Barron, himself

The interviev;er, Ormsby, described

Hamilton's editorials as being "hard-hitting, clearly
stated, brief...". Hamilton also believed in "short,

pithy editorials" which left the reader with one main
idea and not, as he expressed it, a "multiplicity of

unrelated ideas."

This is closely allied to the chief

editor's overall conception as to the way in which one should
approach a subject for report. He cautioned thust "Don't
^believe the man who tells you that there are two sides to

41.
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every question. There is only one side
to the truth." ^3
Above all. Hamilton concluded, the aim
of
the Journ^lt

was

"

to take the quackery and mystery out
of Wall Street.

From his background and his opinions,

I

think it is fair

to acknowledge the potential competencey
of Hamilton in

reporting economic and financial affairs. His lengthy
tenure in the editor's chair would suggest general (albeit
tacit) acceptance of his views and would seem to make him

an ideal representative of American big business interests.

Hamilton advocated trade between America and
Soviet Russia at an early date, and at a time when this

view was unpopular with the Administration in Washington.
The United States had participated in the allied embargo

on trade with the Soviet Union. First, when the Provisional
governmen-b

was overthro\\Ti in November 1917, all unlicensed

trade with Russia was stopped. After February 1918, licences

were no longer granted

without permission from the State

Department and by 1919 all export licenses were revoked.

Even after these restrictions were lifted (January 16, 1920)
official
43.

Ibid.

U. S.

policy stipulated that Russian trading

I
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would henceforth be undertaken entirely at the individual's
own risk. In one of his first editorials on American-Soviet
relations, Hamilton stated: "There may be few things more

distasteful than a recognition of the Lenine regime but
are there any that promise better and quicker returns to

Europe and perhaps to the world? Laying aside natural
feelings of revulsion.

v/e

may see enough economic and

financial arguments for an early resumption of trade with
Russia."

It is interesting to note the implicit restate-

ment of the American dream of untapped Russian markets,
and an acknowledgement that trade must and should continue

despite the uncongenial politics.
P4en

who returned from living and working in

Russia frequently reinforced businessmens* optimism on
U.S. -Soviet trade.

One such American, Albert Coyle,who

had been taken prisoner in Russia, had his views published
in Nation. K<s exp^^iimi that it was judicious for America
to take advantage of a new market

»

ti^e Bol^Vvsvite r«i.vo\uUon

had swept av/ay onerous import duties and had ended previous

domination of the Russian market by other countries. Coyle
had three positive suggestions for American businessmeni

^5.
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they should erect a pennanent exhibition of
Amorican goods
in Moscow, extend short term credit to the
Rujjsian gov-

ernment and build cable connections with Northern
Europe.
He concluded his article with the pithy observation
that

"communication" was the "life of trade."

It can be seen

from this and from previous statements of American business
men, how widespread was the concern for expanding markets

abroad, especially into Russia.

Despite Hamilton's enlightened attitude to

American-Soviet trade, his attitude hardened on the home
front.

In his encouragement of inter-continental trade.

Hamilton may have envisaged that contact with the Russian
communists could demonstrate the superiority of the

capitalist system. Amorican influence v/ould therefore
be experienced monetarily and morally, to the detriment

of communism. At homo, he deplored any overt signs of
The tendency to attribute internal American

communism.

disorders during 1919'"1920 to communism did not stem
solely from Attorney -General Mitchell Palmer. Such also
was editor Hamilton's opinion of the 1919 steel strike.

46.
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To trade with a nation enduring communist rule was

permissible (despite the fact that the American govern-

mentdiscouraged such activity)

i

contamination

v/ith

communist ideology inside one's own country was indefensible. Hamilton admired the article of Clarence

W.Barron (proprietor of the Journal

^

on the effects of

Bolshevism as experienced in Soviet Russia. Here, in
a dramatic portrayal,

"crafty Lenine, Trotsky and other

leaders hitched discontent, oppression and poverty to
a chariot and v;ere drawn to place, power

,

loot and lust.

Despite the changes wrought in Russian society and the

promises of the Bolshevik leaders, Barron continued,
"Russia has not seen peace and bread.

"

The Soviet leaders

actions* were seen as betrayals and consequently Barron

likened them to those of Aaron Burr, Caesar Borgia and
Judas Iscariot.

^8

No room

.

for reason was allowed in

statements such as these. Words which
inspire fear and hate

v/ere

v/ere

calculated to

used, such as 'loot* and *lust

Barron and Hamilton were both convinced that

communism was spreading throughout American society.

Capitalist society was seriously threatened, since it was
48.
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the "arch-enemy" of the Bolsheviks and the latter wished
to destroy it.

Soviet

Nor was this fear totally unreasonable.

theories of v/orld revolution were by this time

well kno\m. Barron believed that Russian propaganda had
had an effect already, since American

irianual

workers,

educated men, graduates and lav/yers were, he feared,

expounding

revolutionary doctrines, including the

destruction of the state.

I4.Q

^

A relieved Hamilton noted

the Chamber of Commerce meeting of 700, who had met to

oppose Bolshevism constructively. At the meeting, the

Governor of Massachusetts, Calvin Coolidge, exhorted
them to resurrect "ainericani sm". Only this, in his

estimation, would counter propaganda that fostered
discontent.

Hamilton, it will be remembered, believed

that there was "only one side to the truth". Therefore,

matters were clear-cuti capitalism stood for freedom,
whereas communism represented a "return to a discarded
system of slavery.

51

Hamilton comforted his readers

(

and presumably

himself) with the belief that there was no great cause
for alarm, because Bolshevism would disappear of its own

^9.
50.
51.
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52

volition.-^

The use of the word "Bolshevism* continued

for several years in the

jJ^lvjcnailc

articles despite the

•

establishment of a potentially permanent Soviet communist
government. The v^ord was employed in a derogatory sense
and was intended to conjure up an image of a communist

similar to that portrayed in many contemporary cartoons.
(These cartoons v;ere syndicated and frequently appeared
in the Journal at this time.

)

This image was half

mythological, half barbarian, intent on wilful destruction
of western civilisation.

It is true that many of the fears

raised by Hamilton and others were legitimate, but it

would have been interesting and valuable to have read
in the Journal a critique of communism in less rhetorical
terms.

The lack of such analysis is perhaps a r'eflection

only of their greater interest in trade. It also reflects
however, their inability to acknowledge the commercial

ramifications communism might have on Ameri6an-Soviet
trade. Hamilton personally represented the 'die-hard*
'

attitude, in which everything was either black or white.
The majority of his readers, it v;ould be reasonable to

52.
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arinumo,

prof erred bunlneco news and the Dow-Joncn
indust-

rials to lengthy anrayRoa of communist activity.
Editorials
wore therefore kept to a minimum and complex
developments
reduced to r;enoralinntions, subtle nuancon enveloped
under
the various cloaks of "cnpi talimn"

"communism", "socialiBm",

,

"aovietism", and "americanism". Here arain, Hamilton was

earrylng out nn intention exprenned in hln bior;raphical
reporti editorials should bo nhort and contain one main
idea.

In thio way there

btcomin/-; confuted.

v/as

lenr;

likelihood of the reader

It wan alno oanier (uning thic method)

to persuade the reader that there Koa no other side to

the quention worth

oxaminiiT^-!;.

Opinions similar to
Gloewhore in the

Jojrrtiai.

tlione of the

Frank

)1.

editor appeared

Vandorlip, precidont

of the National City Bank of New York, and H.P. Davison,

from J.P,Mor£;an and Co., included a tour of Soviet Russia
on their rocpcctivo European vicits. Doth men agreed that

America

could

f^ivo

was ostablishod.
E.

-^-'^

ansistancc only after "stable f^overnment"
In a special article. Captain Wilfrid

Playfair, historian with the Canadian Expeditionary

Force in Siberia, reassured readers that Bolshevism was

53.
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doomed". This presumably was why the opinion of a historian

found its way into the pages

of a business newspaper. This

historian continued that in his opinion, a socialist"
republic Y;ould emerge, acceptable because it would be a
"democracy", something that the Bolsheviks could not offer.
It is difficult to determine upon what exact evidence

this assumption was made, but it is true that the early
days of the Civil War were confusing. Initially, the
anii-Bolshevik forces scored impressive successes under Den-

ikin and Kolchak. However, by the summer of 1919t Kolchak
(praised by Playfair as a "democrat") was frequently

harassed v;hile leading the White Russians and was ultimately
defeated by the Bolsheviks.

American fear of internal Bolshevik influence
can.be instanced by an advertisement from Swift Company,

Union Stock Yards, Chicago, vindicating their.packers from
v/hat

they termed accusations of unjust price-fixing.

Implicit in their statement was the belief that any dis-

ruption of the economic st atus quo would inevitably lead
to "Bolshevism".

The Company claimed that "misunderstanding

'

5^1-.

-
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of Amorican indiintrinl. crrnni v.ation and
of itn bonofltn
to mankind" load "to
unrcnt.dinr.atiafaction nnd radical! nm.
WarnJnr.G of Dolnhovih cunninr; and
nubtloty wore frrqvKnt,
bunlnonninon wore constan tly oxhortod to
beware
propaf^pndn,

inr-:idi

oun"

tho nolo aim of which wan to diccrodit
Amoricon

buninonr; and capitnl

at homo

"

" ^'^

inannf-;f>inont.

Undormininr; capitalicm

intolorabloi trading; with Communinta abroad

war;

wae not. Comieroial profit would holp bolstor
capitalinm»
thufj

norvinf-; to

prove tho lattor'c nuporiority.

In 1921, yet another occuronco wan to convince

buninonnmen of the invincibility of cnpitalinm. Dovantatl
6n.
economic chaoG and famine v/cre tho lcf';acy of tho Kucnian
Civil War.

In I92I, Lonin docidod that bocaUEO of the diro

situation,

a

purely nocialist form of production

have to b6 set anido temporarily.

v.ould

It v/an relncod by

n

new Ryntom of "ntate capitaliom". Unified manorcrnent of

industry

r.ave

way to "trurtn" and (more importantly and

Bif^nificantly for American tradorn) the invo.ntmont of
forel.'^n

capital wao permitted by tho introduction of

concerjnionf; nyatom.

Thia Now Economic Policy led Amoricans

to boliovo that it wan only a matter of time before

55.
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communism" surrendered to "capitalism". Increased trade

might hasten this desired process and at
be profitable.

the same time

Businessmen must have been heartened at the

words of Senator Joseph France of Maryland. He unofficially

investigated Soviet trading conditions. Travelling via
England, he met the Russian Trade Mission and learned

that England received valuable trade infonnation from it
daily.

Senator France rapidly concluded that America

should achieve a similar business rapport. He maintained
that to trade with Soviet Russia was now the only "wise,
humane, and profitable policy." America, he urged, should

begin negotiations at once, if only because England and

Germany were developing maximum trade connections with
Russia. As if to give added emphasis to his exhortations

for American-Soviet trade relations, Senator France also

mentioned that he

v/as

collecting data, during his European

visit, in support of his Senate resolution for resumption

of relations with Soviet Russia.-

It is difficult to

imagine editor Hamilton concurring in Senatof- Hamilton's

pro-Russian feelings, but he probably symp<athised

mth

the idea of trading, since such contact might convince

56.
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the Coriinunists of the strengths and stabilities of the

capitalist system. And mention has already been made
of Hamilton's belief that an early resumption of trade

would be beneficial to the United States.

^"^

V/hatcver might be said of Hamilton's condescend-

ing attitudes to the Soviet regime, he was a realist in

economic affairs, and was not afraid to state his views
on the business scene. His general attitudes

v/ere,

in

any case, shared by the majority of American businessm.eni
a confidence in the capitalist system, and the belief

that it

v/as

possible to divorce economics from politics.

Thus, they could afford to exploit the one and ignore

(while inwardly deploring

57.
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)

the other.
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Amfmi^ an Bankers

B^vV o.rr., 1910-1P?4

p.nd

B usino nnTnon nnd f^oylptr

.

One of the nost persistent post-v,'ar problems given

full coverage in the Jour nal, was that of settling inter-

national

v/ar

debts and bond payments. The Soviet attitude

towards the latter was a recurring source of anxiety for

American bankern. For example, the month of

January I919

was filled with constant rumour and speculation over the
fate of $50,000,000 of Imperial Russian credit certificates.

Russian bond issues suffered stock Exchan^o losses on the
New York market and having learnt of Soviet repudiation
of external debts, bankers feared default. By July I9l9i
a ncv/ly-formed committee of bankers and financiers drew

up a protective agreement to assist those holders affected

by the expected default on the

$50»000,000 of Imperial

credit certificates. As an indication of the gravity of the
situation, the committee was composed of some of the

financial world's leading bankers. These included John
R.

58.

Fulton of the National City Bank of New York, Thomas

mi*

Jan.

9.

1919
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Cochran of

J. P.

Morgan and Co., N.Dcan Jay of the Guaranty

Trunt Co., and Albert

R.

Wiggins, vice-president of the

Foreign Securities Committee of the Investment Bankers*

Association of America.
Despite anxiety over Russian financial obligations,

bankers were loath to let slip any opportunity for fostering possible Russian financial dependency upon the United
States.

"Bankers to help Build up war-v/recked Europe" was

a characteristic headline in the loiLnnl. John

J.

Arnold,

vice-president and head of the foreign department of the
First National Bank, gave the address before a commission
<3f Nov/

York and Chicago bankers, of which he

v/as

also a

member. In his speech, he exhorted bankers to visit

Europe, including Russia, v;ith two aimsi one, to help finance rehabilitation programs in European cities;

tv/o,

to

restore connections with their branch banks in these
countries.

This meeting was closely followed by one

organised by the American Bankers' Association. Once
again, its members were told to support by every possible

means "...the development of the export trade... and to

59.
60.
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July,

10, 1919,
Jan 20, 1919.

provide as rapidly as possible, adequate facilities for

financing export opportunities."
1919

v/as

^'^

also the year of the 'Red Scare* and,

increasingly, official and popular opinion turned against
the Soviet government.

Although the year had begun with

bankers optimistic on re-opening banking channels with
Soviet Russia, within three months, a marked change in
attitude had occurred. In

a

curt reply to a rumour that

the Soviet government had asked for an American loan,

bankers now retorted that it was an "absurd suggestion.

Understandably

"

influenced by prevailing sentiments of

hostility, bankers could now point out

"

that it would

scarcely be sound or proper to finance a loan for a

foreign government that not been recognised by the U.S.
government,"

62

Seemingly inconsistent with the afore-

mentioned desire to deal financially with Soviet Russia,
this attitude may also have been induced by the complicated
and frustrating Soviet fiscal policies of revaluation

introduced at this time. The Soviet 'rumour* serves as a

reminder that the Soviet government was by no means a
passive bystander in these events. In March 1921 » when
61.
62.
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leadership of the Administration changed from Wilson
to
Harding, the Soviet government appealed to President

"

and

Congress, making a formal proposal that trade relations

with America be resumed. Contained in this formal proposal was the Soviet desire to "break down the "wall"

between the United States and Russia."

However,

the Soviet government soon discovered that the new admin-

istration regarded it with disfavor. For instance, post-

war economic reconstruction

v.'as

discussed at the Genoa

conference held during April 1922.

Tv/o

main allied aims

predominated! first, a solution to the debt problem and
second, resumption and development of trade relations.

This was the first international diplomatic gathering
to include Soviet representatives.

Other war powers

of the time included Great Britain, Belgium, France and
Italy, but the United States was not represented. American

attendence, in the eyes of the Harding administration

would have implied de

,iure

recognition, which was still

refused. Officially, the United States government merely

expressed goodwill and the hope that the debt question
jwould..be

63.
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The ^[oMiml reported

countermoves regarding

all the Soviet moves and

debts with unabating interest,

knov/ing that many interests besides the government's \ve(^

directly involved. The newspaper's report on April I7, was
thdt

Russia would recognise all pre-war debts, but by April

21,

this had been altered to a Soviet recognition of pre-

war debts

(x{v\

war debts were specifically rejected. By

April 22, the Soviet stand had become even more specific.

Russia would now recognise only correctly tabulated prewar debts and demanded allied financial aid and recognition.

64

Afxsr all this deliberation and bargaining the

Soviet government rounded off its demands by again

requesting an American loan. The Journal indignantly
retorted that the Soviet government had "all the crudity
of a thief's disordered mind," The newspaper concluded
that this was another example of Soviet audacity, the

arch-villains being once again Lenin and Trotsky. On
this occasion the Journal was glad of govemmental support
the State department and the President being commended for

refusing to "temporise with this evil thing."

It is

not hard to understand American disgust with the Soviet
64.
65.
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delegation at Genoa, especially since negotiations had
not gone in favor of the United States. With American

non-cooperation, allied disagreement and a separate

Russian treaty with Gcrraany in Rapallo, April 16, 1922,
it was not surprising that the Genoa conference failed.
The

debt problem remained largely unsolved and again

Ameri6an bond holders were placed in jeopardy. The protective committee of prominent American financiers and

>

bankers mentioned before, filed claims on behalf of its

depositors with the State department. But any speedy
result from this move

v/as

not to expected, since the

claims were to be met only when the government obtained

Russian payment on defaulted securities.

American bankers* caution in dealing with the
Soviet Union was further increased by the considerable,
though not devastating, losses incurred by some American
firms in Russia. These, including American government

war loan-3, totalled $500,000,000. Among the most prestigous was the New York Life Insurance Company, whose St.

Petersburg branch opened in 1885. After the Russian revol
utions and the war, it had lost $33fOOO,000 of cash and
Jan.

20,

1923.
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BocuritiGO.

67

Combinod rocourcoij of

;1)34,

391 000 from tho
,

National City Bank's two branchoo in Potrof^rnd and

Vladivostok woro lost aftor tho Goviot bank nati onalifsation
in I91.B.

68

Of tho

bir:

cornmorcial companion,

Gingor Sowing

Machin(» and nonoral Eloctric Companies lost investmnnt
totnlr: of

t^o^^

t

000 000 and :1";\000,000 r«Bpoc tivoly. Of
,

tho moro fortunate,
finnnciril loan,

tho Submarine Boat Company oufforod no

althou,":h itn contractr; woro

t(>nninatodi

Standrird Oil of Now Jv.rr^^y romainod Jiopoful of acquiring

privilor.os from ito pro-rovolutionary proporty.

Conoidoring tho finrmcial

69

locooni market dio-

f

location, froquonl Soviot nfforto to itabilloe tholr

monotnry nyotom and bnnk nationalisation, Amotican bnnk5nfr

reaction wan, thou/^h at times inconoistont, undor-

ntandably cautioua and roctrainod. Whilo thoro woro
often pun^ont Amorican crit i.ci:;ma
and

id(K)io/';y,

thoro woro

nliio

0

('

tho alien nyntom

thono nufficiontly woll

noaBonod in fincal mattori; who winhod to expand t)ieir

pre-war Hunnian contacts or boldly,

to

create new

onor;.

It la alr>o truo that, since tht Soviet r.ovornmont

altornatoly thrcatonod American capitalinln and thon

67.

I9--1 H.H.

l^'^y

Pro -Soviot Hunnla,

Finher, Amoricnn Invor.tmontn in

AmCXlcuilJJJLlYiiLJiricUiJiJa-t-iluriii^^^^^

?iVO-- Mr. Fif'hor no Um: that by 191M,
vnJuo of about
tho Compnny pofiMonnod Hunolan bondn to Lho
rai lro;rl ntock).
(monlJ v
,t«?9» 300,000
19^2.
68. WUJ.. May
69. )h\A'
RnyX"Yl»

7-'^^

l<)h9,
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demanded credit facilities and loans from them, many

bankers long remained loath to extend credit to the
Soviet Union.

II.

Businosnr.en.

1-919-1

Q?^i-

.

The outlook for trading v;ith the Soviet Union
during: this period was inauspicious

restrictions
refuE-ed to

v.-ore

€x\^rid.

.

Although trade

lifted in 1920, the State departnent
its official and pov/erful support to

collective trading with the Soviet Union. The Administration
v/ould not recognise the Soviet governnent: many in American

government circles and in business, refused to give up the
hope that somehov/ the Soviet government would collapse.

Consequently, an ambivalent attitude can be detected in the

business world. On the one hand, lay the obstacles to easy
trade and the innate hostility of the Soviet government to
the capitalist system

t

lure of Russian markets.

on the other, lay the persistent
Since the State department had

no objection to businessmen trading at their ovm risk,

and the Soviet policy towards foreign trade softened with
the inception of the New Economic Policy (NEP), various

American advances were made.
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Undor NEP, the Soviet GOvern.T.ent granted trading

concessions to foreign countries,

so

that the skills of

the latter could materially assis t the rebuilding of the

Soviet state. There were several kinds of concessions
and the^r operated v/ithin all sectors of the economy. The

largest single group numerically was concerned with the

development of raw materials. The "pure" concession was
an agreement between the Soviet government and a foreign

enterprise whereby the foreign firm was permitted to
develop and exploit a carefully selected opportunity

within the USSR. The foreign concern could not obtain

property rights

under this scheme. It

v/as

positively

obligated to invest capital, introduce V/estern technology,
and give royalty payments to the Soviet governjncnt. There
v/ere

also less comprehensive, but nonetheless valuable,

technical assistance contracts, in which foreign countrios were invited to participate.

70

It has been felt

necessary to include this brief description of the Soviet
concessions policy, to show that not all the Anierican
advances were the result of exploitative greed, (although

they may have sometimes sounded so) but were frequently
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the ronult of a joint acreemont.

Ono such private concern favored by the Soviet

Union

the Hammer family.

v;as

Perhapc one reason for this

was the fact that Dr. Julius Hammer (born in Runnia

187/4-,

died in the United States I9'f8) had been a founding member

of the Communist Party of the United States in June I919.
In 19^3»

the Hammer family operated jointly v/ith the

Russinns, the Allied American Corporation (Alamerico) sharing

both capital and profits on a fifty-fifty basis. In addition,
the Hammers were {granted (also in I923) a f^eneral trading

concGEsion, which gave them the right to establish an office
in Moscow and to represent a large number of American

companies.

71

Nor did this concession policy concern itself
solely v/ith ideologically sinnpathotic customers. For instance,

during this period, Standard Oil of New Jersey negotiated
with the USSR for concessions in the Caucasus. The company
hoped to regain its pre—."ar output and to develop new fields
in this area.*^^ General attention focused on oil concessions,

and these wore among

tlie

important issues discussed at the

Genoa Conference, which began v/hile NEP was getting under

71.
72.

Ibid., pp. P^68-269.
mil* Feb. 7» 1922.

way in the Soviet Union. The Journnl carefully reported
the oil debates,

sensing that they

v/ere

a target for

international concern and rivalry, v;hich would inevitably
involve the United States. For example, Britain's rep-

resentative at the Genoa meetings, Lloyd George, had

attempted by direct agreement with the Russians, to obtain
an oil monopoly for the Royal Dutch-Shell Company, Krassin,

^

Soviet Commissary for Foreign Trade, also a delegate at
Genoa, emphatically denied that the contract signed with
the abovcmontioned

an oil monopoly.

Shell Company in any

v;ay

constituted

It was, he argued, a 'selling* contract,

by which the company and the Soviet government arranged

a

partnership for soiling oil on a fifty-fifty basis, with
divided profits. This altercation led Krassin to encourage

Standard Oil Company to apply for a concession.
it succeeded.

Eventually,

By the agreement, Standard Oil became part ovmer

in largo oil properties in the Baku region of Russia.

Another beneficial Americm contract was that made between
the International Barnsdall Corporation and the trans-Cauc-

asian states for rights to develop natural resources and
handle all products, particularly in the Baku area. The

hold on these contracts, "TTowever, was tenuous and could

73.
7^.

^J.^.

^^^-y

W^.

r.^ay

1922.
13f 1922.
3.
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be v/ithdrav/n instantly by the Soviet government.
in such a project eculd bo costly,

Investing

therefore, and involved

considerable risk. For instance, :2oviet officials ordered
the Barnsdall Corporation to halt all dril] ing operations
in 192^.

'

Nevertheless, opportunity for contact and

contract now existed on a fairly finn basis and many American
firms, hoartene^^ by the initial success of their pacesettin,";

compatriots, took advantage of this. Zinovicv,

representing Lenin at the

Con^munlst Congress, mentioned

1^2.2>

460 concessions applicants, of whom 56

v;ere

Am.crican.

He

further reported that concessions had already been granted
to 26 of the American contingent.

Drawbacks existed, but the majority of contracts

apparently were honored by both sides. If not, then the
Jourral failed to report them. One of the most valuable

American concessions was that gained by the Harriman group.
This consisted of a 20 year manganese mining concession,

centered in the Tchiatori beds in Georgia. The JoM rrcd

de3ightedly claimed this as
Germans,

a

gain at the expense of the

since the latter had absorbed ^2% of the exports

during their

exploitation of the beds, the American share

then being only

77

7^;.

wr.T,

76.
77.

il'ril,

April 8, 1922} Oct. 11,
Mny 23. 19?-3.

"HZl.

Doc.

31.

192/I-.

192^^

-

Many American trade unionists shared big businesses

ambiguity over relations with the Soviet Union. There
some, like the vociferous Samuel Gompers,

rejected economic lirJcs of any kind and

v/ho

v/ho

v;ere

steadfastly

regarded the

Soviet government as treacherous and brutal. Others, whatever their private feelings, may have been willing to

attempt economic cooperation, as were many businessmen.
The Amalgamated Clothing V/orkers Union, for example,

endeavoured to enter Soviet markets by forming the Russian-

American Industrial Corporation. This project

was engineered

and the concession obtained by, Sidney Hillman, the union's

president. Capitalisation for this venture was set at

$l,000,000t

7

cloth factories and

2

cotton mills were to

be operated in Moscow and Petrograd. Hillman expected a

yearly turnover of $40,000,000 and the profits were to be
divided between the Soviet government and the Corporation,

according to the investment made by each. A former president

of the American Cotton Company, William

C.

Thompson,

was employed to see that business and building arrangements
were carried out efficiently. Although the Corporation was

ostensibly formed to assist Russian reconstruction, the

53

iJj221IX.zL

firmly reminded its readers that the

would not bo run "philanthropical] y"
the

"

Gtockholderc "benefit."

78

t

nev/ ventijrc

but rather, for

Guch a statement

shov.'s

that former hopes that the Soviet system v/ould speedily

disintegrate were fadin{^

.?nd

being replaced

v/ith

more

concrete, realistic aspirations.

Which fim^s rejected or abandoned trade relations
for ideological or other reasons? Unfortunately, the
Jnurr.?.!

yields no information. The

i

r^ea

of a considerable

and lucrative Russian market remained and conceivably

induced American businessmen to exam.ine the possibilities.
No reports of small firms taking part in the concessions

policy have been found, presumably because they could
not supply the capital requirements of the Soviet Union.
A further inducement to big business could have been the

fact that by 192^W a number of countries had officially

recognised the Soviet Union.

These included Britain,

France, Italy, Norway, Austria, Greece and Sv;cden. Thus,
as E.M.Miller,

statistician to the National Bank of Commerce

from Russian
in Now York, pointed out, emphasis had shifted

might
politics to Russian business. American businessmen

78.

i/SJ:.June 9f

1922.
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have felt the need to enter Soviet markets in order to

keep out undesirable competition. Mr. Miller

v;as

pessim-

.

istic about the future of American-Russian trade. Commenting

that commerce with Russia
all US exports before

v.'as

of small importance to over-

he could see little in Soviet

economic policies which would improve this situation,'''^
This dismal prophecy

v/ast

fortunately, unfulfilled. It

is true that the rise in US-Soviet trade was hardly meteoric,

but there was a steady increase, especially from I929-I93I.
Such relations as individual firms did have with their

government's official enemy cannot always be measured in
dollars and cents, or in import and export figures. There
is,

even in the bleak and uninformative trade reports of

the Journnl and in some business magazine literature, a

firm realisation that the problem of the Soviet Union

would have to be tackled by other methods than physical
suppression, as in the Civil War period, or by simply

ignoring it, as in the policy of non-recognition.

7Q

E.M.Miller, "Place of Russia in International Trade,"
IilSiZMWi:.,VI, 192^. pp. 3-15. For USA/USSR trade
figures, see Appendix B.
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Many American
idoac; of

buGiness^non may h:ivo had their

Russia and thon the Soviot State formed, modified,

and altered by one or other of the trading: orf^anications
v/hich facilitated trade between the

tv/o

countries.

This

is (at the moment) difficult to prove, but a survey of those

or^^anisations and some of their members will, at leant, show

that '^.merican businessmen and bankers did not operate in

a

complete vacu\im. The non-reco,r^ition policy of the American

government did not prevent Russia from establishinp; trade
orp;anisationG in America, nor from operating-; through

individual American companies in a

v;ay

denied the United

States in the Soviot Union. These organisations and the

opportunities for

contact they offered, may have fostered

mutual understanding, between the two nations. Certain it is
that many American

companies availed themselves of the

services those bodies offered, thereby extendin,'^ commercial

links with the Soviet Union.
Two of the earliest tradin/^ corporations in this

period were the Russian Information Bureau and the AmericanRussian Chamber of Commerce, both founded in I9I6. Their
professed aim wns to foster trade and promote pood economic

1
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and coir.morcial relations botwoen the United States and
Russia. For this reason, personnel

v/as

dravm from political,

industrial, and financial circles. The Bureau initially

included Russian government officials and representatives
from the All-Zerastvos Union, an association of local gov-

ernment advisory bodies established in Russia in the late
«

1860*s.

80

From the political world came the redoubtable

ex-president Theodore Roosevelt, and business and banking
were represented by the heads of

som.e

industrial and financial concerns.

8

of the loading
The sheer involvement

of these men in all aspects of the business

world shows

that they have a substantial claim to be regarded as

leaders in their respective vocations. For example, Edward
Nash Hurley, originated and developed the pneumatic tool

industry in the United States and Europe. From July 191?

-

until July 1919 he was simultaneously chairman of the

United States Shipping Board and President of the Emergency
Fleet Corporation. Ke rose to be a director of the Chamber

of Commerce of the United States and president

of the

«

American Manufacturers Export Association. His interest
Tntorvcn? ( Princeton.
80/ George F. Kennan, Th- rr-ip;9-.
New Jerseyi Princeton University Press, 1953) vol.11,
pp.
81.

J22-'}2J,
Information
a list of the members of the Russian

For
Bureau, see Appendix

.

C.
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in foreign trade is revealed by his membership
of the

Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and his involvements as a director, in the National Foreign Trade Council.

Another member of the Bureau, Charles Albert Coyle was a
financier and manufacturer. His offices included presidency
of the General Electric Company from its origin until
June 1913* and

chairmanship of the Board until May, 1922.

Most 6f the other members of the Bureau were similarly
engaged in business or finance, particularly three men
involved with the commercial life of New York City. The
first, Darwin Poarl Kingsley, was a life undervrriter. He

rose to be president of the

New York Chamber of Commerce

in 1920-1921, and became chairman of the Board of the New

York Life Insurance Company in 1931,^-^

The second, Charles

Hamilton Sabin, was a banker and director of numerous companies. He was president of the National Copper Bank of New
York,

1907-1910, vice-president of the Mechanics and Metals

National Bank I9IO, and rose to chairmanship of the board
in 1930. He was also president of the Guaranty Trust Company, as listed in the Appendix.

The third, Jacob Henry

Schiff, not only had varied financial interests but also

(Chica.^ Illinoisi The A.N.
Who in AT,oric:i
Marquis Co., 19^3) vol.1, 1897-19^2.
83. I^IA84. Ib5d

Rp.

Who

V,'^'^

.

.
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personal interests in Russian affairs. Born in Germany in
13'l7,

he eventually came to America and married Theresa

Loeb.

This

v/as

for him a significant step, since Kuhn, Loob

and Company was one of the well-established banking con-

cerns in the City.

Schiff soon became a partner in the

firm, as well as holding directorships in three companies,
the Central Trust, Western Union Telegraph and Wells Fargo.

Schiff s interest in Russia did not stem primarily from

a

desire to increase financial contact, but rather from a

deep-seated conviction that he, as a Jew, should do all in
his power to assist Russian Jews. In the early 1900*

s,

Schiff had been spending his own money to help Russian

pogrom victims and when the Russo-Japanese war of

19d

broke out, he did even more. Japan went to great lengths
to

justify her actions to the world, and this entailed

assisting Russian Jews. Jacob Schiff was gratified and
impressed, and to spur the Japanese to greater efforts,
he floated a $25 million loan for the Tokyo government.

Other loans granted by Schiff amounted to $200 million
and were thus responsible for subsidizing half the war

effort against Russia. His continued efforts on behalf

85.

UlLd.

-
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of Russian Jews v/ore dcterininod and even embarassinc to
the administration of Theodore Roosevelt.

It v;as Schiff

who founded the National Coininittee for Relief of Sufferers

by Russian MassacreSf and his efforts helped raise over $1

million to aid Russian

Jev;s.

8

^

A man v/ith such connections

and such intorects as Schiff would therefore be an obvious
choice for a Russian Information Bureau. Another Bureau

member,

v/ho

also v/orkcd in New York, was Oscar Straus,

sppointod chairman of the Public Service Commistion in
1916.

V/hethor ho had any personal interest in Russia is

difficult to establiiih., but he must have acquired useful
economic and trading knov;lodco since he had served as

Roosevelt's Secretary of Commerce

ani

Labor from I906-I9C9.

87

Slight acknowedgement was given to professions other than
that of finance. Apart from Theodore Roosevelt, there

only two other members whose main interest
One was Lawrence Fracer Abbott, president of

Company, from I89I until

[publishing

19''^3.

v;as
tlic

v/ere

not finance.
The Outlook

Ho did have soL.e

financial interests however, being a trustee of the New York
became
Life Insurance Company from I9I8 until 1931. v/hen he

fairly
secretary of that body. He knew Theodore Roosevelt

86

Arthur W Thompson k Robert A. Hart, TIi^lJIpj:!!^
Press, 1970),
(Amhernt. Mans! UnWersity of Massachusetts
.

t

r.r>

^.h

72-7/4.

10':-106,

11/^-116.

133-13'*.
University of Massachusetts Press, 19£8) pp.

-62-

welli

since the latter v/rote for Ontlcok

.

Abbott had alco

edited Rooseve3.t*s African and European Addresses and

v;aS'

to be author of a book entitled IinTresGionG of Thecdr>r(=>

Roosevelt

,

v/ritten in 1919-

Nicholas Murray Butler,

v/ho

88

The seond member was Dr.

spent most of his v/orking life

as president of Columbia. His broad range of interests»

especially in international affairs, must have made him
a most useful member of the Bureau.

89^

Although no direct

link can be proved at the moment, betv/oen the Bureau's

activities and the eventual official recognition of the
Svoeit Union, it is possible that such a group of men,
over a period of time, could influence effectively the

opinions of reluctant businessmen and stubborn politicians.
The second organisation founded in I9I6 was
the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce.

Its counter-

part, the Russian-American Chamber, had been established

in Moscow under the chairmanship of the Russian indust-

rialist, N.I. Cuchkov. The American Chamber was composed

of financiers and businessmen from nearly 50 .major
interested in
manufacturing and financial institutions

was Reeve Schley, a
trading with Russia. Its president

Marquis Co.,

-S^^'Vpi^S^.

Publishing Co., Inc., 1963).

(New York: Dell

«
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vice-prcGidont of Chase National Bank, one of the
major
institutions financing US-USSR trade. It later
became

a powerful lobby in the campaign- for recognition
of the

Svoiet Union, and resumption of full trade with credits.
The Chamber's attitude towards the USSR was, on the whole,

one of optimism and it gave a realistic appraisal of the

current economic situation. Official government policy
was viewed with disfavor, since it did little to facilitate
trade between the

tv:o

countries. Nor did the Chamber hes-

itate to give voice to its dissatisfaction with government
policy. For example, the Chamber, in a statement to the

Secretary of State in 1922, asked under what conditions the
Department v/ould agree to accelerating American-Soviet
commerce. As a pressure point, it emphasized that American

failure to capture Soviet m.arkets would leave a void which

would be filled only too willingly by Germany,

90
^

This

representation had no success, but it is indicative of the
seriousness with which leading American businessmen and

bankers viewed the American

-

Soviet situation.

Two other organisations should he mentioned here.

The first is the Committee of Commerce and Marine, appointed

on,

Knnnnn. TV|» Dncinio n t^^ T ntorve n£» (Princeton,
New Jersey Princeton University Press, 1958) vol. II,
pp. 323-324? Antony Sutton, V/osto rn To ohn o l.QJi^LJilli ^OY i ct
g^np_..n.^o P,-.v.-|o-pnrnt. 1017-1.9'^.0. ( California. Stanford
I9t>b),
Univa-rsity Press, Hoover Institution Publications,

Hf^orrT^

F.

I

]

pp.

289..

.

»
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the annual convention of the American Bankers
Ag^^oc-

iation in 1919. Robert

F.

Maddox, president of the latter

body and of the Atlanta National Bank, chaired the first
committee meeting. The purpose of thin f if toon-man
committee

,

composed of come of the leadin^^ bankers,

was to gather ideac and to decide policy on fore\3n,

iric\ud\rvcj

Soviet^ trade. The committee also intended to make recomm-

endations to Congress, supporting enlarged and official
trade relations, hence the need for influential and outspoken

members.
The second of these organisations founded in I9I9,

was the American Commercial Association, which aimed at

promoting trade with Russia. It was established by a group
of American manufacturers (representing over 100 firms)
and included members of the Le High Machine Company, Eebroff

Foreign Trading Company, Now Hide Manufacturing Company,
Fairbanks Company, and the Morris Company of Chicago. As one
of its first goals, the association called for removal of

restrictions on financial restrictions with the USSR. Not
satisfied, the president; Emerson

P.

Jennings, visited the

Soviet Union in 1921 to examine the situation firsthand.

Ql.

WSJ: Jan. 22,

1919* For list of mombgrs,

see Appensix E.
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Not unGxpoctedly, he returned disillusioned and wrote a

strong condemnation of Soviet rule. After this development,
emphasis returned to the internal American scene and the

need to extend American-Soviet business facilities. Jennings

frequently urged the United States government to advance

•

:

credits to the Soviet Union for the benefit of American
manufacturers.

"

These organisations are indicative of the intense

American business interest in the Soviet Union and the
efforts made to reopen trade relations. It is difficult
to

establish direct links between organisations, but there

was some overlap in membership. From the Appendices it can
be seen that Messers. McRoborts and Kingsley v;ere both

members of the Russian Information Bureau and the AmericanRussian Chamber of Commerce} Donald

V.'ing

belonged to the

latter and to the Committee on Commerce and Marine; Charles
oppSabin belonged to all three bodies. Thus, there were

ortunities fcr exchange of useful material and comparison
various groups.
of trading prospects among members of these

companies which
Moreover, several of these men represented
Russia before the Revolhad had commercial relations with

ty» hoover ±ns

289.

ou o^uii

287,

-
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ution and v/hich

were still trying to maintain contact.

Their cxpcrisnco

v/ith

Russian methods

v.'ould

have been

useful and may have partially accounted for the membership
overlap. By no means did all the firms represented come

from

Nov/

York City, although they may have maintained offices

there.- Thus, although the hub of American-Soviet trade

and commercial activities

v.-as

Nev/

York City, business

concerns and their representatives from all over the United
States were involved in these operations.
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The year 192^
f^oviot tradG relations,

a turning point in Anericsn-

w^in

for it was during this year that

Amtorg, one of the most important and influential trading

organisations, was formed. Slowly improving trade between
the two countries probably influenced its foundation.

For

example, American exports to the Soviet Union rose from
$2^1.6

million in 1913* to

$^l2.1

million and $68,9 million

in 192^ and I925 respectively.^^ On the Soviet side,
the continuation of MEP kept demands for American goods

at s high level. Also, United States businessmen had been

heartened by the rcoctablishment of the Russian State
Bank in 1921, and the attempt to produce a stable monetary
system. As a result, a

nev/

currency, chevroncts bank notes,

vas issued in 19-2 and the demise of the old currency set
for May 10, 192^. Am.erican bankers, thus feeling consider-

ably more secure, begsn to cooperate with the Soviet State
Bank.

Five banking concerns, including the Guaranty and

Equitable Trust Companies, and the Public National Bank,
all of Now York City, agreed to act as agents for the

State Bank of the USSR.

93.

See Appendix B, no.

So,

1.

despite what the New York

68

nm^'

catasorised as "lugubrious" State Department
warnings,
and the government's continued
refusal of
recognition, banking and business concerns
gathered
momentum. The Xi:?.7^ highlighted those aspects
of US-

USSR relations which were of special interest
to businessmen. An important inducement to trade, in its
opinion,
was the grov/ing Russian market
the Soviet Union had
been -pending $^0 million for American cotton, while
i

American firms had shipped 1000 farm tractors to the
USSR.
The newspaper welcomed this improved situation, and
urged

businessmen to continue their efforts, and to ignore
their government's official attitude. For, as it astutely

pointed out, "political formalities" counted "for little,
with such a market. "^^

Like many businessmen, the Timns

regarded ideological differences between the two countries
as something extraneous to the business world. Consequently,

it refused to arbitrate between the capitalist and comjnunist

position on the Soviet Union's resumption of the gold
standard, "Whichever interpretation was correct, argued the

Times did not "alter the fact that Russia's businessmen
The New York Tires will hereafter be footnoted NYT and
The Times has been
referred to in the text as the
used here and in the following pages almost exclusively,
since the Jour nal contains no substantive reference to the
new organisation, not docs it possess detailed accountcf of
the continuing progress of American-Soviet trade during
this period.
95. NYT, Nov. 16, 192^K

9^.
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and ours" could "do business on a considerable scale. "^^
It was in such a favorable business and commercial climate that Amtorg

v;as

formed. Amtorg, essentially a

consolidation of Arcos America Inc. and the Products
Exchange Corporation, was organised according to New York
State law and capitalised at $1,000,000.

Its main function

was to act as the exclusive representative in the United
Statss, of the Russian Gostorg, or State Export and Import

Department. It was also the sole representative of Arcos
Ltd,

of London, the selling and buying agent for the Soviet

government in Great Britain. In 1924, both sides were represented on Aratorg's board of directors by T^essers. Hoorgin
(Chairman) and Ziev (President) for the Soviet Union and

by one Mr. Ohsol, for the United States.^' The ManupJ. for
Soviot-ATrericnn Trndinr: defined the Amtorg Trading Corp-

oration as the "agent for most of the foreign trade organisations of the USSR in transacting and carrying out op-

erations connected with the import of goods from the USSR
into the US and with the export of goods from the US
to the USSR.

"

^® Forwarding agents and shipping brokers

were the Deutsch-Russiche Transport Geselschaft, or "Deruta",

96.
98*.

Hll,.. Nov.

16,

1924.

John*E. Felber, Mr^m^^l for ^nvi ot«Americ^n Trnd i r.g
Intertrade Index,
(Newark, New Jersey: International
1967)» P.29.
*
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in which W. A,Harriraan and the Hamburg-American
line had

50% control, the other half passing to the Soviet Union.

Amtorg's formation exemplifies the growing contact between

American and Soviet commercial and financial authorities.

Amtorg increasingly acquired the role of a commercial
"clearing-housG" for trading and industrial contracts.

Prior to Amtorg* s formation, for example, the All Russian
Textile Syndicate bought its cotton through the Chase

National Bank of New York.^^ After

Amtorg took over

192^^,

the responsibility for exporting cottonj agricultural

machinery, electrical supplies and leather goods, and

importing flax, furs and ore. Chairman Isaiah Hoorgin

confidently predicted that America could easily and

profitably acquire a Russian market. Indicative of the
possibilities, in his opinion,

v/as

the Russian purchase

of $35,000,000 to $40,000,000 worth of American cotton.

•

He implied, as had previous business articles since 19l7t

that a large Russian market awaited American traders.

Perhaps as an incentive to hesitant American businessmen,

Hoorgin declared that this new corporation could easily
exceed the $1,000,000 monthly trade average of the
"

99.ILn:f

June 19f 1924.

twov.
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concerns which had heon merged to form Amtorg.
The extent to which Amtorg's activities were

reported in the press reveals its

v/ide

connections with

American business and the recurrent ideological problems
it posed for others and faced itself. An example of its

commercial dealings can be given from a trade report

by Leon Talmy, director of Amtorg's Information Bureau.
This document shov;ed that

,

in 192'+, America

export of tractors and cotton to the

hs.d

cent a large

Soviet Union and

had granted six month credit facilities to expedite trade.

For its part, the Soviet Union had permitted its Oil Trust
to trade through Amtorg,

and had sent

A. P.

Scrobrovsky,

president of the Azerbaijan Oil Trust to the United States
to study American oil-refining methods.

hopeful signs, the

Tirr.oG

101

Despite these

was careful to steer a middle

course between undue optimism and unnecessary pessimism

regarding US-USSR relations as a whole. The truism that

businessmen were notoriously conservative

and would thus

in Russian affairs,
hesitate before becoming deeply involved
A Wall Street
although modified, still merited attention.

apathy of some
representative; concerned at the apparent
100, mit J^r^s i9» 192^.
101. nxHf ^ov. 16, 192^^.

V
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businessmen, openly accuced the government of leaning

over "backwards to prevent /unericans dealing with Russia,
It was obvious that many business and financial concerns

would feel apprehensive about making contact with the
Soviet Union, fearing possibly that official disapproval

might reveal itself in other ways. Consequently, an "official" as opposed to a "personal" view was expressed on

trading possibilities. For example, a representative
of one of the Trust com.panies,

who was also the New York

agent for the Soviet Eank, told the

TlTr.os

that ho "of f ici:illy"

advised customers that they traded at their own risk. His
ov;n

feelings were that Soviet trade was no more hazardous

than that of many other countries. He considered the danger
of the Soviet Union defaulting to be minimal, since it know

that any credit facilities received wore dependent upon
a stable financial cystem

102
.

His point was well made,

for the procurancc of American credit proved a constant
source of anxiety for the Soviet Union, despite the fact

that it did not default on payments.

There were other sources of potential influence
on businessmens* behaviour towards American-Soviet trade.
i02.

m"., Nov.

16,

I92.i\,

t

•
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In an

Outlook article, headed "Business

v/ith the

Eolsheviki"

Stanley High firmly declared that the NEP was "not

comm-

unism". He discerned several indications that the Soviet

Union was "prepared to
ions to private, trade.

malte
"

ion
^

many of the necessary concessLater, in Nation* Harry

F.

Ward,

head of the Methodist Federation for Social Service,

cautiously argued that NEP in no

v/ay

indicated that the

Soviet Union had given up its hostile

attitude towards

private trade. Ward stated that he had even tried to

evaluate the situation from a Soviet viev.-point, but could

only come to the conclusion that the Russians were willing
to move slov/ly towards their economic aims.

NEP,

therefore,

did not represent a total change of policy, at least in

Ward's opinion, merely an adjustment which could ultimately
be used to fulfill previous communist claims. He acknow-

ledged that this policy did not conform to the

tem.po of

the profit-making system, but declared that as long as the

Soviet government

v/as

satisfied with the country's pro-

gress; there would be "no return to private capitalism."

moving in
The Soviet Union, reasoned Ward, was clearly
the opposite direction.

103.
104.

^^'^

The 'differences in these two

Outlook Dec. 10, 1924, pp. 592-4
Nation . July 8, 1925, PP- 64-6?.
,
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opinions, represent the confusion into v;hich American
businessnien and business cor.entators were thro\vn, by the

Soviet adoption of

ITEV,

Professor Peter Filene has

adequately demonstrated the misinterpretation and mis-

understanding of American capitalists on this sub ject.

'^'^^

Although individual documentation is not readily forthcoming, it v/ould seem that the majority of businessmen
and bankers favoured the opinion expressed by High. They

honestly believed, and fervently hoped, that NEP

v/ould

move the Soviet Union closer to the kind of capitalist
and profit oriented system of the United States, Moreover,

since capitalism and civilisation

v;ere

American businessmen, their reaction to

sjTionj'mous to
riEP,

(v/hich

most
they

understood to be a negation of commiunism) can more easily
be appreciated.

Tv/o

other factors motivated the comjnercial

world to consider the USSR as a serious business propositioni
first, the perennial lure of Russian markets, and second,
the belief that the more contact Soviet officials had with
the V/ost, the more they might be influenced avray from

communism. Professor Filene has already pointed to the

American mistake of putting too much emphasis on the "retreat"
1917
q
105. Peter Filene, /-ncric-ns t.^ the Soriot ?:xpcr;n'r'nti
Press, 19b7)
tQ?3 . (Crjnbridge, Mass,, Harvard University

--

pp.

103-105.
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and too little on the "strategic" in response in response
to

Lenin's characterisation of NEP as a "strategic retreat."^

Mention has previously been made of the "official" and
"personal" reactions businessmen might alternatively

express on US-IJSSR trading
and "private" attitudes

.

relations. These "public"

persisted. A Nation editorialf

headed "Russia in Wall Street", supported the attempts
at economic rrpTrochoment

this dual attitude.

,

and in doing so, referred to

The editorial claimed that "v;hile

the business world as a v:hole has maintained its suspicions

of the terrible Bolsheviki, here and there experimenters

have entered on pioneer path of friendly and normal trade

relations.

"^^"'

The progress of Amtorg itself is indicative of
the vddening trading interests betv;een the two countries

and indirectly, of a willingness to submerge political

differences and concentrate on commerce. 1925f ^or example,
saw the acceleration of agricultural machine shipments to
the Soviet Union. One such shipment, amounting to $2,000,000
ports.
was arranged through Amtorg and sent to the Blade Sea

obtained
The Yuba Manufacturing Company of San Francisco

106.
107.
108.

109.
^53.
N'-t.jon . Oct. 21, 1925. P.
NYT . March 2k, I925.

Ibid.

,

p.

,
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through Aratorg, a contract for $1, 200,000 v;orth of elec-

trically driven mining dredgers for the Ural Platinum
an important concession in manganese, a necessity

Trust

for the steel industry, was obtained by tho W.A. Harriman
group.

''^

Most of the contracts were large, both in quantity

and cost, and many proved mutually beneficial. Amtorg's

chairman, Isaiah Koorgin enthur^iastically reported a $1,000,
000 turnover for 1924-25, and forsaw increased Russian

expenditure in America because of the rapidity of Soviet

reconstruction and the need for tools and equipment.
That Amtorg and its operations

v;ere

111

respected,

chose
can be seen by the kind of business concerns that
to work with it.

This fact had greatly impressed an edit-

mention of
orial writer of the Nntion. who made special
concessions
the fact that no "outside speculators and

with the USSR.
hunters" were opening trading contracts
several incursions
On the contrary, he concluded that the
.

the familiar and
into the Soviet market were made by
business and financial bodies, like the

well-established

Guaranty Trust Company, the Equitable

Trust Company and

Mention was also
Company.
Trust
Bank-Columbia
the Irving
19'-5
109. IlXt» April 18,
110. mit J^i^e 16, 1925
111. KLlt June 2, 1925*
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made of the large investments, particularly by the Chase

Manhattan Bank and the Equitable Trust Company. ^-^ Professor Antony

Sutton has also categorised the aforementioned

financial houses as being leaders in the Soviet credit
113
business.
Something more of Amtorg's effectiveness in

softening US-USSR economic relations, can be seen in the
Times

'

report of a tragedy that befell the trading company

s

in August,

Chairman Hoorgin and a Soviet representat-

1925.

ive, George Slankey, were drowned in Long Lake, New York

City,

The Timos

tone.

It

*

s

obituary was informative, and cordial in

sketched Hoorgin* s early life as a Polish Jew,

and his activities since 1921, when he became a member
of the Soviet Legation in Warsaw. From this point, he had

increasingly involved himself in Russian economic policy.

HooTgin was credited with Amtorg's phenomenal rise in
business* from its 192^ capitalisation of .$1,000,000
to,j$50,

000,000 in one year. The Tines also praised his

"proverbial courtesy" and gave the impression that American

businessmen in general, liked and respected him.

1

14

There

is nothing extraordinary about this obituary. Nevertheless,

112. lintian, Oct. 21,
Sutton,
113. Antony

1925,

pv/r-^t^-pn

^53.
Teohrolop:v nnd rcviot EcomiDXe.

PQVolo pment. loi7-T0?0 . (California, Stanford University
Pren^s, Hoover Institution Publications, 1968),pp. 289.

11^+.

mi,

Aug.

28,

1925? Sept.

13»

1925.
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it illustrates the fact that Soviet representatives

were

beginning to be treated and judged as individuals, and
that ideological differences could be excluded. The very
fact that ideology

v/as

not mentioned was some evidence

of the importance of American-Soviet trade, and showed
an almost conscious desire not to rupture the advancing,

but alv;ays delicate, trade relatfohs.

American banl^ing arrangements with the Soviet

Union greatly improved once it became evident that the

Russians could avoid defaulting on credits. One result
National
was that financial houses such as the Chase
more liberal
Bank and the Equitable Trust Company granted
quick to note
credits for cotton purchases. The Iim!L£ was
evidence of the
this positive reaction and reported "as
Russian situation,"
increasing Wall Street interest in the
possibilities included
that a discussion of further trade
listed in the Directory
men
prominent
most
the
of
"...some
"^^^ Unfortunately, it did not specify who
Directors.
of
Soviet Union's proven
the
despite
However,
these were.
committments, the pace at
trade
her
all
meet
to
ability
Tif. NYT. Oct.

6,

s

>
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which America extended credit facilities did not match
the accGlerated growth in Soviet reconstruction and
her

consequent industrial needs. As a result, the USSR turned
to Europe,

v/here the Germans in particular,

on preferable terms.

Some

^:20

offered credit

millicn worth of Soviet

busine.ss had been diverted to Germany from the United States,

for this reason. Other European countries also benefited
from American reticence in credit donation.

J. A.

Poliakoff,

an Amtorg representative, complained that the "whole credit

business" was the real stumbling block to
ed trade,

sv/ift and

Ke confessed that the American autobus

increas-

v/as

superior

in quality to that of British Leyland, but the latter*

credit offer was more generousj .tecrican manufacturers
could only offer a few months credit, v;hile Leyland offered
two years. Poliakoff maintained that the Soviet Union

was "still too poor to pay cash for American goods when
1 1

European countries" offered "long credits."""
~

Nevertheless,

£

American-Soviet trade increased,

as many including the new chairman of Amtorg, Saul G.Ercn,

forsaw. Credit difficulties notwithstanding, important

116.

mx^

May 23, I926.
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contractc for Aniorican farm machinery,
tools of all
descriptions; automobiles, tractors,
and all manner of
factory equipment v/ero obtained throuch
the offices of
Amtor^^ The foundation of this trading
corporation was a
significant step in the progress of trade
relations.

Some such official body was necessary
to demonstrate to

businessmen that good faith was possible on both
sides,
and that commercial contracts could be honored,
despite
the inhibiting factor of conflicting political
ideologies.

Also, Amtorg was useful in that it gave American
business-

men an opportunity to meet with Soviet trade representatives and to discuss pressing matters at first hand.

Gradually, therefore, businessmen could accustom themselves
to Soviet bargaining practices and arguments,

something

which many diplomats and politicians did not enjoy until
after 1933- By the early 1930' s, so much progress had been
made that not only were American goods going to the Soviet
Union, but also American manpower, in the form of technician

and industrialists of all kinds.

£]iap.tc.r._6

AnrirlCiiri-.MELn power in thp

»

Soviet Unjon

As the 1930 *s progressed and the United States
found itself in the throes of an unprcccdently damaging

economic depression, businessmen
Bcorned the communist system,
to tho Five Ycr.r Plan

.

nov;

v/ho

had previously

gave serious consideration

The interest in Soviet markets

was developed not so much for the beneficial effect it
was imagined that the USSR would derive from contact

with a successful capitalist system, as for the v;elcome

boost communist economic demands gave to the American

'

market. The magnitude of this boost can be seen by the rise
in US exports to the
in 1929,

Soviet Union from a value of

million in 1930.

to

'^"^'^

$8^1

million

Another area of American-

Soviet business expanded greatly during the 1930 *s and that
Americans to leave

was technical assistance. Among the first

for the USSR

v/ere

technicians from Hugh

Cooper and Company.

L.

Their services were used in the construction of the Dnieper
River power plant. Colonel Cooper's services were evidently

highly regarded, since ho

See Ap-oendix E, no.

iSaa,
p. 221

involved in several conferences

The Soviet Union also sent many of

with Stalin himself.
117,

v/as

—

1.

„

.

.

t-

^irr.r.Y,+

V:„v^;!i^^ Mass.,
Hnrvard University Press.
Moc.^.. Harvard
(Cambridge,

1

ol 7-

1967;

itG own indu::tri:iliEtc to America to study method and

and tochniquc.

In l928-29» for example,

Soviet dolc/^ationa

cor.prioin^?:

I33 special

delecations and rep-

resenting every important induotry visited America J' "^^
Saul Eron, one-time chairman of Amtorg's board of directors, commented favourably on the rise in number of

individual engineers and foremen rent to the USSR. The
I927--8 figure of

^fOO

rose to 800 in I929.

'

This did not

include a delegation of nearly 100 American businessmen sent
to the USSR under the auspices of the American-Russian

Chamber of Co:rmerce. Furthermore, in 1928, the Soviet
Republic was visited by representatives of over I50 American firms, many of them loaders in their respective fields.

120

It is difficult to be precise about the number of American

engineers and technicians employed in Russia at any one
time but Professor Fileno has noted that in 1931

1000 Americans were working for the Soviets.

121

»

mo^re

than

What were

tho attitudes of these industrialists and buoinessmon to
the Soviet rystom?

In general, it v;ould seem that, while admiring

most of
the fortitude and persistence of Soviet workers,
Saul Bron, Sov^f>t Kcononic T TY^^ lpprngnt n^ Aricr^Pan ^o-^o
T^uiin-rs, (New Yorkt Horace Liveright, 1930 ). PPvisiting business rep120. Ualil. Also , for a partial list of

119„

r\

'

121.

Peter
Ti-

221.

tho cn-ineers and technicians cU-iikod the
autocratic mothodn

and pr-ferrcd the ccncu-cr benefitG and civic
freedomn of 'the

United Statec. For

exa.'^plc,

in a ccnvercation between Mr.

John Calder and Walter Duranty, recorded in the
magazine^
I^JLLlI^t

the forr,er,

employed in the USSR with the McKee

Company of Cleveland, wac quoted as having saidt "In America
on a big steel job re know at the start that some of us

won't live to see the finish, tut we have been lucky at

Magnitogorck-hcw }ucky!-and

have got the furnaces built

v/e

a few days ahead of schedule.

tell you that no engineer

I

in Aracrica would believe such a job possible with unskilled

labor."

This appeared in one of a number of very detailed

articles on the progress of the Soviet Union after the Revolution, printed in

F^rt^;rf^

magazine. In fact, they were

printed, as the preface in Fortur.o explained, to try and

combat what that magazine characterised as "American ignorance
on Russia". Not only

v/as

the diligence of the Russian worker

admired, but the Soviet Five Year Plan itself was lauded as

being better, "in theory at least," than an unplanned economic system. '^^ Clearly, Fo rtune

,

one of the most projnincnt

business journals, was inferring that American businessmen
122.
123.

FiirlXlli

ILLl.

-:^rch 1932,

pp.

76 cnwardsi pp.

I25-I32.

I

mlrJ.t

v/oTi

cJo

to o'/'^rrJno Bomo aapootn of a plonnf^d
ooonrmy.

The article citlod an im

uy.i.inj.h-^

wrought by tho Plan, tho 700 now
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wltli

nf

"profound"

t)ir>

chEin''<?B

faotorler, r-qnlppod
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^
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j
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to
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and had, in fact, made little progress since the Revolution.
The

7.^j:t\\ns.

article, for example, conceded that the USSR

'

had gained by the Plan in oil, industrialisation and agricuture, but asserted that the general living standard had

declined from 1928 to I93O. It acknowledged a rise in I93I,
but 'maintained that the living standard was still below the
1927 levels.

Since the article

"gave no

definition of

what was meant by "levels", the comparisons are useless
however, the statement itself is indicative of the general

feeling in American business circles that the Russian people
were paying a great personal price for industrialisation,

.

According to the same Fortune article, the Five Year Plan had
so

tightened its "ir6n belt" that until 1931

Russia's imports could be eaten,

v/orn

t

"only 8% of

or enjoyed." And then

in graphic tones the article went cn to give an example of

deprivations experienced by the Russian people:
sweet and

... 1,

500,000

juicy tangerine s-which Russians would love to eat-

literally were takan by the State out of their watering
mouths last year, and sold abroad."

It is not a little

time when
ironic that such' sentences could, be written at a

personal hardships
many Americans were enduring overwhelming
125. Zcxllim* March 1932, PP.
126. Ibid .

I25-I32.
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an the result of deficiences in the economic, industrial

and commercial sectors.
The underlying hostility to Soviet methods of
govemrr.ent apparent in the above statement

in the testimony of Phillip

J.

v.'as

reflected

Harty of New Jersey, given

before the House of Representatives Committee on Ways and

Means \n 1931* The Committee was conducting hearings on the
proposed bill to place an American embargo on Soviet goods,
and Harty testified at the request of the initiator of the

embargo bill, William V/illiamson, Representative for South
'

Dakota. Jiarty is an excellent example of the large number

of American engineers who eventually returned to the United

States with a strengthened belief in the capitalist system
and its values.
to- the

"^^"^

Representative Williamson introduced Harty

Committee as an engineer

able time in Russia."

v;ho

had spent "some consider-

Williamson also confidently claimed

that Harty was "perhaps more familiar with Russian conditions
"^^^ This was undoubt...than any other man in this country.

edly an exaggeration since many engineers had had experiences
required to
similar to those of Harty, but Williamson was
are
—^Jl^-.l^t'l ^ltl^^^^
n+hor> pysni>olos

"^^i:^^ ^^^^

128
.

3rd.

driven in

^i^

^

Peter Filcne, ;-rerj„Pnr.r ?.n^
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
h; ;?ng; before the Committee

onH.R. 16035. (February

19.

20,

21.

1931.
D.C.t Government Printing Office.

129.-1^-

1931J

waonm^
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prove his caco in a convincing manner.
In his opening statements to the Committee,

Harty declared that he had been sent to Russia under the
auspices of Amtorg, with which he had signed a contract
to supervise the rolling operations of a mill in one of

the plants of "Stal" in Russia, for a two year period.

Almost all Marty's comparisons

between American and Soviet

conditions were invidiouci his only favourable comment

v;as

that the younger Russian workers were "enthusiastic" about

their work. Harty appears to have entered the USSR with a
firm idea of what he would find there: hov;ever, his extended

travels did nothing to assuage his earlier convictions.
This was clearly discernible in his testimony, which began:
"The minute

was they

I

v/cre

arrived in Russia my impression of the people
like so many thousands of mechanical men,

directed and operated by one great dynamo or electric switch.
No matter v/here one goes he sees poverty and filth, and

this is more noticeable in the
in the larger cities.

in Russia

I

snail

villages than it is

During my stay of five or six months

did considerable traveling, and

conditions every\yhere.

I

I

found terrible

have been in Leningrad.

,

Moscow,
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Mokoevka, Kharkoff. Meriopul. and Stalin.
Run^sia and
KuznotG, Siberia. .. .From experience in Ruscia,
in my
opinion, there are two classes of labor, conscript
and
convict.

The only difference is that the former receives

a small wage and have to feed themselves, while the
latter
are fed by the soviet. ... Living conditions in the small tov/ns
are bad?

food ir scarce

j

workers are dressed in rags. Most

everything saleable that is produced is exported."
In this recital of personal impressions, there

existed little magnanimity. No allowance was made for
the fact that in a twenty year period, from I9OO to I920,

the Russians had endured

tv;o

devastating wars and a trem-

end ous social,political and economic internal revolution.
The methods of Soviet communism may have boon inferior
to those of a capitalist system in dealing vrith these

internal problems, but the period of the Depression was

hardly the time to so

arg^je.

V/hat we

find in Harty's

testimony, then, is the impactofa first encounter with

what was to become an alien culture. The attitudes and
first impressions of visiting American businessmen and

industrialists and technicians filtered through the
business journals; magazine articles and newspapers, to
130. Uliii.

the AmericD.n reading public, and may have tGon instrum-

ental in ncms small

v/ay

in bolsterins a waning belief

in the total efficacy of the capitalist

systeir..

Despite

the human suffering engendered by the Five Year Flans,
the acl:nov:l edged technical and industrial success of this

economic planning achieved

tv/o

things: first, it formed

'a-

a background against which /jr.orican failures could be

critically cxaT.inodj second, it provided a spur to the
adventurcuc bucinossman, anxious to expand his markets.

Apart from individual engineers and technicians,
Uiany

important American firms became involved in business

deals and contracts v/ith the Soviet Union. These included
V/estinghouse Electric, International Harvester Company,

General Electric and the company which perhaps had the
most impact on Russia, that of Henry Ford. Entitling a
column "Henry Ford conquers Russia", ^:aurice Hindus wrote

enthusiatically of Soviet pride in Fordson
Quoting

IzXJlzll^it

tractors.

Hindus reported that Leningrad metal

into
and electrical factories had now introduced "fordism"

their plants. Furthermore, Hindus optimistically wrote, it
was a personal victory for Henry Ford himself
to Lenin,

t

"...Next

Trotsky and Kalinin, Ford is possibly the most

widely known personage in Russia.

"''^^

It might seem

incongruous that a capitalist should achieve so much pop-

ularity in a Communist country, tut Professor Nevins has
suggested that the Soviet leaders regarded Henry Ford not
as a capitalist, but as an economic revolutionary."-^

Ford's involvement in Soviet reconstruction, ccmbined with
his predilection for offering opinions on a variety of
subjects, make him' sn admirable example of American business

initiative. Naturally, his attitudes towards the USSR are

not entirely representative of the whole business communityt
they do however, give an insight into the ideas of at least
one important businessman, who not only had contact with

Russia; but also

v/as

a moulder of American public opinion.

As Professor Nevins has succinctly pointed out,
"The initial relationship was purely commercials Russia

bought and Ford sold."

"^^-^

Soviet interest in Ford's

technical assistance occurred in I926. The Ford Company
was invited to send a delegation to the Soviet Union to
examine the servicing of the 20,000 odd tractors in the
techcountry and to begin training Russians to use Ford

sent to the
niques. Henry Ford accepted and five men were

111.
132.
133.

Juno 29, 1927, PP. 280-283.
A. Nevins and F. Hill, Forr^t ExDnnsi on nnd Ch al1/- nrPi
^04.
1232, (Now Yorkj Charles Scribner's {jons, 1957) P»
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1

Soviet Union, including VJilliam
Ford CoRp2.ny and an ongincor

Aftsr extensive travelling
the delegation

v;as

G.

na>'7ied

Collins of the Italian
Brsdc

H.

Eorghoff.

and. .investigation,

during v;hich

given anple opportunity to see Fordson

tractors operating on Russian soil, the five technicians
were unimpressed with Soviet managerial talent. Regarding

general industrial methods as inefficient, they decided
not to set up a Ford factory in Russia, since they had

concluded that the Soviet Union was not sufficiently

equipped for such an innovation. However,

v.'hen

v.'ell

Soviet

officials approached the Ford Coripany in 1928, their
efforts met v;ith success. The final contract was signed
by Henry Ford, Valery Meshlauk, vice-chairman of the Supreme

Economic Council,

(for the Soviet Union) and Saul

G.

Bron,

for Amtorg. The agreem.ent included the exportation of
$30,000; 000 v/orth of Ford cars to the Soviet Union and the

construction of a Ford foundry under the auspices of the
Soviet goverrjnent.
This contract involved much more than simply

purchasing

machinery. Henry Ford agreed to give the USSR

Russian
the rights to make, sell and use Ford machinery;

134.

F.Hill, forrl^ ^yprnnian
Nil, Jvne 1, 1929? A. Kevins and
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engineers were granted accecs to Ar-crican plants; and

Ford's

engineer::;,

ov.-n

it

also agreed, v/ould be sent

v/a£3

.

to the Caviet Union to help with plant installations

and training. Superficially, this

v;ac

an extensive

business deal. Underneath, hov;ever, Henry Ford had a
tv;c-fcld ain; as outlined in one of his publications.
«

Firsti he believed that such an action v;ould improve

international relations? second, he
an

v;as

convinced that

advanced nation should be prepared to assist others,

for "industrialisation meant prosperity and prosperity

advanced world peace.

"''-^^

For all his desire to assist

Russia industrially, Henry Ford hir.solf

v/as

in no way

sympathetic tov/ards ccmr.unisin. He abhorred the system
as one v/hich "sought to deny Nature."

And it was his

conviction that Nature had, in retaliation, rejected
the USSR.

Ford held strong views on the relative positions

of /iincrican and Soviet v;orkers: in comparison to the United
Statesi

Che

Russian v;orkcr had no individual freedom, and

right
was treated as a slave. Freedom he defined as "the

decent living
to worlt a decent length of time and to get a

for doing so...

it is the aggregate of these and many

great idealistic
other items of freedom which makes up the
Freedom.

133,

"'-^^
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Hailing the superiority of the American's
working conditions over those of his Russian counterpart,
Ford

v;as

simply echoing the opinions of many of the

American engineers and technicians who visited the USSR.
While i± is difficult to say exactly why Henry Ford

made this and other commercial arrangements with the

Soviet Union,

som.e

of his statements quoted above reveal

a surprisingly idealistic outlook.
"be

said that all his ventures

v/ere

Yet it can hardly

undertaken from either

this or from a profit m.otive. In fact, Ford did not

profit financially from the above-mentioned contract: he
lost $573,000. He had, however, gained an important foothold
in the Soviet market, and the ground

contracts. By no means all

v/as

v;as

laid for future

lost, and as Professor

Mevins had pointed out, such a deficit was bearable.

137

The Soviet contract gave Ford an enviable opportunity
to prove that,

despite' the current American financial

crisis, capitalism could produce valuable techniques

and quality goods. Moreover, Ford had been able to put
some of his

o^Nn

ideas into action and the Tj,m?? caught

something of his many-sidedness when it quoted him as

137>

A.
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*
Hill, ZordjL.Fxi-:^
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saying, "No matter where industry prospers, v/hcthor in
India,

in China or Russia,

all the v;orld is bound to

catch some good from it."^-^^

138.
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The yearn I930-I932 proved to be a tccting period

both for Amtors and for the American businonnmen who traded

Soviet Union. Decpite the bonef ic.i nl

v/ith "bhe

t':^rov/th

in

tradir^contactn by coinpaniea like Ford, countcractinr;
forcer, emorfod durin."^ the early thirties which had unploac-

ant and dobilitatinc effects on American-Soviet trade relat
ionn,

In Americat the Wall Street crach and the economic

doprecsion had reinforcod the feeling of beinf threatened
Americanr? had had since the end of

from uithin,

v.'hich

World War

Jur.l ar

I.

the period covered in thir. thoGis

bee;an with the fear of alienc,

Scare",

1:0

an demonstrated in the "Red

it ended v;ith a further out-burst of anti-

Rovictlcm. Thin cuspicion of communism was kindled also

by those who resented the apparent success of the Soviet

Union's Five Year Plan, while the United States suffered
an economic slump.

Considerable pressure, therefore, was

find the
brought to boar on business and labor leaders to
In lar;-e part,
causes for the nation's economic malaise.
and communism
this investir:ation sou-ht a scapecoat,

some of the
conveniently was hold to be at the root of

-96-

problems. The events of these years were not only
import-

ant for their effect on the American business attitude
to the USSR.

It can also he argued that they v/ere, in-

directly, partly responsible for bringing American-Soviet

economic relations violently into the foreground, at a
•fcirne

when political and diplomatic recognition of the

USSR was being proposed openly in many quarters. The

ro-emergence of a vociferous anti-communist movement

propelled Amtorg, ostensibly an economic organisation,
directly into the political arena, with two significant
results. First, it revealed some of the difficulties
v/hich could arise v;hen there were no

suitable diplomatic

channels through v;hich resolution of problems might be
sought.

Second, pro-recognitionista wore greatly aided by

Amtorg's eventual vindication both by American govern-

ment officials and businessmen. Thus, publicity had been
given to the 'cause' and a more favourable climate

attained for the consideration of recognition.
At first, the virulent anti-comriiunist campaign

seems incomprehensible. The Depression had made the Soviet

market an attractive one to American businessmen. Persistent
efforts had been made to maintain and expand commercial
contacts

,

and in 1930» American exports to the USSR had

1

reachod tholr poak,^'^ But no had Soviet oxportr. to the
United States.

"^''^

And it was around thic fact that

animoGity grew.
The Soviet,

had been

as well as the American,

economy-

badly nhakon by the Depression. V/orld price

lovc.lc had pluminottod,

thus forcin?;; the USSR to incroaco

{greatly its exports in order to maintain ita customary

rate of machinery and industrial purchasoG, Western

nationG, including the United States, desperately beset

with their ovm economic problems, seized upon

Soviet action

iir,

tliis

a useful explanation for their ovm

economic shortcoming's. The Russians wore charged with

attempting to monopolico narkcts and of destroying
competitors; and particularly, by "dumping". The rise
in American-Soviet trade which had been f brmerl y so

enthusiastically received was now berated by many
American

businessmen as an attempt to overthrow

capitalism. Professor Filene

h.-s

accurately explained

the
Gomething of the true situation in reality, many of
:

completely
accusations levelled at Soviet policy wore not
fair,

139.
li^O.

methods
since a socialist economy operates by
See Appendix li. No,
See Appendix B, No.

I.
2.

-98-

different from those of a capitalist system. Also the

Russian government was not trying to monopolise markets;
it had been forced to lov;Gr its prices in order to sell

more goods. Hov;ever, each country perceived and inter-

preted these Soviet actions in various

v;ays,

and mis-

interpretation beca-me the reality of the moment. Furthermore, the arguments becpjne shrouded in ideological warfare
and propagandist terminology. Hostile American business-

men consequently

cam.e

to consider the economic question

of 'dumping* in a political context. Thus, it is not

enough to point out the ironies and misunderstandings
of this particular situation

t

one m.ust also follow the

argum.ents of the protagonists in their ov.m v/ords. From

them one can obtain an insight into the hysteria aroused

by the dum.ping accusations and of the hypocrisy

that

re suited.

from
Early in 1930, Amtorg was forced to digress

politics, in a m.ore
the path. of trade and follow that of
heretofore. One of the prime movers

pronounced manner than

Woll, vice-president
behind this development was Matthew
Labor,, and acting president
of the American Federation of
Stating'^hls particular
of the National Civic Federation.
activities of Communists"
"subversive
the
be
to
concern

in tho Unitof3 Stateci ho cin^r^led out Amtorf; for npecial

attention.
Cpranrnnict

V/oll

charcocl that Amtorf^ v;as a "covor for

a^Gnts and propr-gatidints,

"

^'^^

He inveighed

againnt thoco "few inductrialistc and commercial men"
who v/ore tradinr; with the Soviet Union. These men, having

been "beguiled by Coviot economic concescionn and prompted

by

tlio

desire of private profit and exploitation of

Rucsian re::ourconf
V/oll

"

wore advocating rocogriition. Thin

oppoced, I^loreovor, ho demanded eradication of nuch

noxious contaetr: by means of a trade embargo on the Soviet
Union,

I'll

The nttackc on Amtorg and the rcquentn for an

embargo were to continue intermittently for the next

tv/o

yearn.

When called before a Congrecsional Committee
inventigatin?:; Communicm in the United Statec, Well castig-

ated the government for jeopardising the safety of the
state i for the sake of "helping American corporations
do b-a-inoss with Russia."

lie

considered that the hoover

officials"
Admin;iGtration had been "too lenient with Amtorg

banned
who should be carefully watched and prdferab,ly
^''^
Well was supported by the chairman
from -the country.
1^0. Lin:, March
141. Ibjji.
1^12.

j^iYl.

1930

July 12, 1930

i
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of

-the

Committee, Hamilton Fish, Congressman of New York,

who saw no reason why Russians should be "allowed the

hospitality of our free country" simply because they spent
money in the United States

.

Woll warned American capital-

ists that in trading v/ith the Soviet Union they were "sett

up

n

Frankenstein

them."

^

Much of

"

which would "some day come to plague
V.'oll's

testimony had the aura of crude

sensationalism about it and he admitted that he could
not point to any specific Communist activities -of which
he disapproved.

He believed it was the administration's

duty to discover them.
Some American businessmen were prepared to

support V/oll's speculations and accusations with facts.
For example, the president of the American Manganese Prod-

ucers Association, John Carson Adkerson, called for an
embargo on Soviet manganese. Besides the now familiar

accusation of 'dumping', Adkerson used what was to become
a principle argu.ment for the imposition of an embargo

the so-called 'slave labor' in Soviet industry.

Slave

labor, Adkerson maintained, enabled Russia to produce

thereby
manp-anose ore more cheaply than American dealers,

143.

iDid

.

creating unfn.ir competition. The USSR's manganese price
was $26 per

tcin,

per ton.

Predictably, Amtorg's representatives denied

as against the American price of

the accusations.

The president of Rudo-Export,

$3^1-

the ore

exporting corporation of the USSR, argued that the United
States Steel Corporation and Bethlehem Steel had used

manganese from the Chiaturi mines since

American output

1.886,

"because

insufficient to meet the demands of

v.'as

the steel industry. He pointed out

that the United States

required 800,000 tons of ore a year but only produced
'^6,000 tons.

This need alone, he contended, would disprove

the accusation of dumping and unfair competition. Moreover,
the Soviet ore president argued that,

since Russian mangan-

ese was sold on long-term contracts, dumping could hardly
be involved.

'^^^

Two members of Amtorg, J.Eudish and

S.

Shipman took the Times to task for its statement that
Soviet manganese

v/as

about to "strangle an infant industry".

How they asked, could irports totalling half of one per cent
of total production harm or destroy American industry?
To support their argument,

they stated that manganese

begun
was not an "infant industry"! American production had

Ikn,

ELlf J^ly 26,

K^Bi^dJch

1930

anfs.S. Shipman,

Znxl^^^J^^^

(New YorkJ Horace Liveright, Inc.

1931;

P-

'^"^^

as early ac I832.

Budish and

Sh5,pmr.n

As for tho direct 'dumping

'

charges,

argued that the American Anti-Duiriping

Act of 192? had defined dumping as Rolling merchandise
at loEG than itc fair value (as tabulated by the foreign
marl;ct value

Since,

).

they continued, the prices of

Soviet ore in other countries

v.-ere

less than those in the

United States, the USSR could not be accused of unfair
pr5 CO fixing.

1/17'

Nor wore they any less critical of American
attcr.pts to establish a pulp'.vood embargo,

According to

Budish and Shipman, American imports of one eighth of
one por cent

of the domestic consumption

coold not

possibly harm domestic output. Furthermore, the only
Soviet lumber exported to the United States
v;hich v/as scarce in America.

v/as

spruce,

Even then, they maintained,

it was sold at higher prices than American spruce of
1

domestic production or that imported from Canada*.

8

They found corroboration for this contention in the

otatoment of

H.ll.

Oxholm, Director of the Lumber Division

of the .U.S. Department of Commerce.

In a letter to the

New York Lumber Trade Association, dated April 18, 1930i

147.11:11.,

ms.ihisL.,

pp.
pp.

'f2-'^9.

72-74.

Oxholm donJod
ber.

tii-it

tho Ruaaianr. wore undornolUng tholr lum-

In fact, more monDy had boon paid for Soviet
lumber

than for almllar kinds from ©astorn Canada. In hio opinion,

Soviet lumber

not come into direct competition with

clid

American wood,^^*^
Amoi-ican bunlnoBB opinion wan divided on the

IrBue of dumping,

but

.-it

the outret

accucorc

t}io

v;ore

more vociferous than the dofendern. The Tiin^H foarod
for the health of American markotcj
of the Troarury,

f:;A;ymour

Lovmnn

Accintant Gecrotary

or.^'^god

cations with Peter Bof^danov, Chairman of

in bitter alterArntor^?;j

American

iranganoEo producers ropoatcdly dompnddd an embargo.
to liif^hlit^ht the intonno Gucpicion

As if

into which Amtorg

had fallen, Federal authoritien obtained evidence of
umugf^ling by an alleged employee of the Company.

The

proverbial "little black book"^ cuppocodly containing
tho namei and addronEOO of 25 Soviet agontn working in
the UIjA and Japan
acc^uiceA.

had

al:::o

been diccovorod,

The affair

the anpoctn of a grand fiacco, Iloatodly, Chairman

Bogdanov protested Amtorg* s innocence. Attorney CeneralXO.

1^*9.

Iliiii.

550.
151.

mi*

m.

7^^
July 26,

1.930

Ji'iy 27,

1930

»

p.

^

Tuttlc

Iciinely

admitted that ho had "not docidod whether...

the mnn arrcrrted had boon acrociatod,
Hic!

only jurjtif ication for

hie:

.

.

with.

.

.

Amtorf^".

curlier conclucion was

that ho had r.croly quoted from the tcctirr.ony of the
cucpcct.

Movortholcsc, Federal invecticationc con-

tinued and within the cnno

Attorney Generr IXR Tuttlc

drug Gtoro of Jocoph
intention
v.'ac

v;aL;

*

v/cek
c

Federal agent c from

office dcccerided upon the

Cchafran of New York City. Their

P.

to uncover what thoy had teen led to bclievo

a centre of secret Communist activity.

The raid was

Schafran stated that he was not

or.barascinGly abortive.

a Communist, but a "Tammany man and a m.embcr of the Pontiac

Dom.ocratic Club." Understandably irritated, Schafran

queried,

"V/hy

docs business

don't they
v/itli

between him and

after }!enry Ford?

}Ie

too

Soviet Russia. The only difference
is that he sells them automobiles

:nc

and tractors and all

I

sell Amtorg is herbs and toothpaste.

Revelations such as these did more harm than good to the

anti-communist cause. Situations initially built up
to appear formidable were discovered in reality to be

ludicrous. The investigations were almost an instinctive

152.
153.

^

3
Iin!i~'uly ::9»
im:. J^jiy 30, 1930.
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action on the part of the adninistr-tion, harascod
as it
wac by daily protect of Soviet undercGlling. Gradually,
it bocE-mo apparent to many,

including bucinecsnen, that

not only was the evidence cf the Com:nunist activities

flimsy and untrurjtv/orthy, but also that cuEpectod activities

.

had been blo-A^ up out of all proportion. And

just as the Federal investigation of "chafran had failed
to reveal any evidence of a communist plot or conspiracy,
so too did the hearings conducted by Assistant Secretary
S.

to provide conclusive evidence, either

Lov,'mnn-"'fail

that pulpv/ood was being processed by convict labor, or
that the Soviets

v/ore

underselling it in the American

market. Consequently, the embargo was lifted en August 1st,
1930

1

a similar decision

Treasury Andrew

V/,

v.-as

reached by Secretary of the

Mellon, regarding Soviet export of
154

manganese on February 24, I93I,
Despite official negation of an embargo policy,
attempts were made periodically by the anti-communists
to obtain one.

Many American businessmen, hov/ever, rejected

this uncomprom.ising position and continued to believe that

improved US-Soviet relations would lead to a profitable
l^^. Journp.l of Ccrr-rce . (Now York}. Feb.

25,

1931.

-io6-

increase in trade. During tha embargo crisis, several

business spoliesmen stressed that Soviet cooperation with

American industries was esssntial. For example, George

V/,

Sisson, who was closely connected v/ith the timber industry,

pointed out that 6ixice the pulpv/ood from the Adirondack
forests was nearly exhausted, supplies had to come from
somevmere. Almost

of Canadian wood was unexportable

^lO^

and if Soviet pulpwood could not be imported then his

company's paper plant would be forced to close.

industries

v/ere also

'^^^

Other

adversely affected by the embargo,

while representatives of the New York Stevedores Union

complained of unernploiTnent, since they were forbidden

by the embargo to unload and reload Soviet pulpwood.

1

"^6

Everything seem.ed to suggest that the latter had not injured American labor or industry, but that it was in facti
a necessity.

instrumental

The threat of unemployment was undoubtedly

in making the People's Lobby

severely

criticise Matthew V/oll's repeated requests for a general
155.

S-vlet Econom ic Trp.deT(New Yorki
Horace Liveright, Inc. 1931) P- 93. Mr. Sisson was
president of the Raquctte Paper Co., past president
of the American Paper and Pulp Association; member of
the Exec. Committee of National Commission on Wood Utilisation, US. Dept. of Commerce; President, Empire State
Forest Products Assoc.,; member of N.E. Forest Research
Council for Federal Forest Experimental Station, Amherst,
Director cf American Forestry Association.
Mass.
•Rnr'i^h

156. liiid.

I

nnd

Shi-n-inr.f

pp.

9^^-95.
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embargo on Soviet goods. The Lobby caustically declared
that V/oll could not possibly spoak for all organised
labor,

since his organisation represented

of ^1-7,000,000 employed A.^.ericans.

'^^'^

only 3,100,000

Businessmen also

became more outspoken in their opposition to embargoes
in general. For example, a group of Brookl^^Ti businessmen,
who had had direct contacts v;ith Amtorg, quickly came to
the defence of the Russians as traders.

The Export Steam-

ship Company (a Brookl:^^! line) operating betvreen

Nov/

York

and Leningrad, reported excellent business relations, 0.3.

Whittaker, of Sperry Gyroscope Company, which had a technica

assistance contract with a Russian Electric trust,

v;as

even

more specific. He stated that his cor.pany had "never had

any grievance against the gentlemen of the USSR" with whom
they. had traded, neither did they expect any. He complemente

Soviet traders by saying "...Their word is good and they

scarcely resemble the m.oving picture notion of v/hiskered
anarchists.

'-^

Official administration policy since 191? had
always been to acknowledge a separation

betv.-een

politics

and economics v/hen discussing the Soviet Union, This facade
157. Iim, July 29, 1930
158. NYT . August 1, 1930
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was maintdined during the embargo crisis. For example,
the

Ti-'nq:

quoted an "authoritative VJhitc House source"

as stating that the soverranent's attitude to "Russian

"bus--

iness" was "not tacod on itc official attitude tov;ard3
the character of the Coviet goverrjnent,

"

-"^

This enabled

President Hoover to oppose the dectructicn of all AmericanSoviet trade, while deploring cominunism and the Soviet
system. I'^oreover, the crisis demonstrated that this division
v.'as

unrealistic, since many who supported the embargo pol-

icy did so for political as well as economic reasons.
The pro-Russian traders also had something else v:orking
in their favor.

The financial and economic situation in

America was such that few could afford to turn dovm orders
and contracts that came their way. Presumably facts such
as these account for the reluctance of President Hccver to

support the embargo efforts v;holehcartedly and for the

.

rapid modification in the attitudes of Assistant Secretary

Seymour

Lov.nian.

Formerly a vehement antagonist of Amtorg,

and its president Bogdanov, Lowman by early 1931 > considered

that an em.bargo policy "would mean the loss of about $120,

000,000 a year in.

159. EHi,

J^^-ly

30,

..

trade with this nation, for they [the

1930.
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Riujsianri^^ ^-^^

^'^^^^ in spite of all the

stories... to the

contrary, and they will certainly not buy from
a country

that docG not buy from

theiR."~^''^

Despite its official

policy therefore, the Hoover Administration acknowledged
the
importance of overseas trade with the USSR and we

c^ji

discer

the initial stages of official acceptance of an economic

and political fact of life.

By 1931 » the commercial aspect also dominated
the minds of Congressional circles.

before the House Committee on

VJays

embargo on Soviet goods, John

B,

At a hearing in I93I

and Kcans on a proposed

Trevor of the /vmerican

Coalition of Patriotic Societies got short shrift from
the r..embcrs.

In his testimony,

com.prehcnsive em.bargo

Trevor had argued that a

would be a useful means of arresting

the advance of communism in the United States. He was,
he stated,

concerned with the "principle" of the matter,

whereas he considered that the committee were concerned

merely

v;ith the

this Mr.

possibility of losing export trade, in

Trevor showed considerable prescience, for trade

did oF^erge as the dominant consideration of the Committee,

160.

NY^. Jan.

19»

1931.
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Tho responses of ono

Con*.Tn5.ttce

r.Gmber,

Congressman Heartsill

from Arkansar, is v;orth quoting in full, ninco it

Racorio

rcvoals to

v/hat

oxtont the

corr.nnercial

"

acpoctD of the embargo

cricie had per-noated national politics. His words also

adequately sum up the position of many of the *prc~Soviet*
businessmen.

"While

do not approve of the Russian form

I

of government," said Ragon, "yet what

v/e

are interested in

here is the economic effect that a thing like this |\n

embargo^

v.'ould

have.

cannot afford to sacrifice the inter-

V's

ests of this country in the cconcmic condition that it is
in

nov/|

.

in order to be patriotic, and patriotic societies

have no monopoly 6n patriotism in this country. Politically
v;e

are against them, but arc
1

That is the question."

v;c

against them com.mercially?

61

the convenient division between politics

Thus,

and economics was maintained, but events had shown that in

many areas eccncm.ic problcm.s could not be left to the
individual businessman to solve. The power and machinery
of the state

v;as

needed and inevitably American-Russian

trade and commerce entered the realm of national politics.

1^-1

Hearings before the Com.m.ittee
on V/ays and Tioans, House of Representatives, /1st
Congress, 3rd. Session, on H.R. 16035 (February 19, 20,
Office,
21 '1931) Washington D.C: Government Printing

y,^y^y.r-ry

0(^,r^rv+

i

1931, pp.

21-29.

r>-p^

1

ts

1
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The 'dumping* and embargo c^npj'.ign^ of the oarly
1930'

3

had had an adverse effect cn American-Soviet trade

relations.
in 1930*

From a pca^ of over

$11^5

there had been a drop in

million of US exports

1.931

to $103 million,

$12 million in 1932 and $8 million in 1933.

There were

other im.portant reasona for the decline: commercial tills
of Amtorg coiild not be diaccuntcd and rc-dicccunted by
barJkG cf the Federal Recerve

had no judicial status in

syEtem; Soviet organisations

.'Vm.ericaj

and therefore had nc

right to court protection; absence of consuls m.eant diff-

iculties over authenticating legal documsntsj Soviet gold
was not allowed into the United States, thereby handicapping
the Soviet Union in covering her unfavorable trade balance.

But by far the greatest Soviet grievance was the difficulty
in obtaining extended American credits.

The situation

became serious and both sides appeared to be caught in a

vicious circle. The Russians could not trade freely without credits: the Americans were reluctant to extend long-

term credits because trade relations
regulated.

v;ere

not officially

The hope that official recog^iition of the USSR

"

would help place trade on an organised, legitimate
basis
provided some of the monientum behind the recognition movement.

Calls for recognition greatly accelerated during
the 1930 's but a considerable body of opinion had advocat-

ed such action in the mid-1920'

s.

Most of the articles

and statmonts made some reference to the trading advantages

that recognition might bring to both countries. For example,

an editorial in th3 Natiori maintained that large credits
v.'ould

be impossible to grant to the USSR "until official

•

recognition" gave a "new and evident stability to the
situation."

The article pointed cut that the largest

American credits received by the Russians came indirectly
through British and German agents: direct contact would
speed up communication and would assist in reducing European

competition for the Soviet market. This article also predicted prophetically, that a time would come when "Big Busines

would "force the Government to recognise the Bolsheviks.

163

The hope of increased trade and an improved world market

for /^jncrican goods

v.'as

undoubtedly one of the factors which

prompted recognition.
162.
163.

The Nation . Oct. 21,
Ibid.

1925f p.

^53.

113"

Incroasinsly it

v/rjr;

rcaliccd that credit diff-

icultioF; v^^re the main obctacles to closer trade.

huGincGsmcn

knev/ that

American

larger credits wore the ansv/er, but

many remained distrustful of the Russians, and fearful
of debt repudiation and the possibility of having contracts

invalidated.

These fears endured for at least two

decades, dospitu the fact that Soviet organisations in the

United States had always mot their financial and contractual obligations. A residue of suspicion lingered on in

finnnci^l minds, nurtured by propaganda on both sides, In
addition, American businessmen who found themselves in

commercial or financial difficulties with

the Soviet Union

had no recourse to assistance from their own government.

These themes were developed in an article published
in the I.itorarv ^i^est in August 1929. Here it was argued
,

that the most potent reason for official recognition of the

Soviet Union

v/as

that "American dollars" were already "rec-

ognising Russia quite thoroughly".

''"^^

T\\e

author listed

four other reasons for diplomatic contact: first, the United

States was Russia's second best customer^ second, Russian^

purchases from the United States amounted to $100,000,000
Iin, Oct. 2/4, 1928
165. T.iternrv Dir- QSt, Aumist 17. 1929,
talks with Russia", pp. 8-9.
I6l\,

"The American Dollar

a year;

third,

the Soviet Union thought highly of Ar.orican

technical a.hilities and usod it to develop itn own industry}
fourth, commercial contacts provided

v.-elcorao

hard-prG3CGd American manufacturers.,''"^^

custoiners for

That ever-recurr-

ing belief in the extent and importance of the Soviet markets
v.'as

clearly

shov-Ti

in quotations from various ncv/spapors

and journals reprinted in the same Liter -^r^r ni^Pr.t article.
The Nov/ York World

'

considered it not at all surprisin-^

that businezsmon should favor recognition, especially

when one acknov/ledged tho "peculiar situation of

a

growing

foreign trade without benefit of consular service, commercial
attaches or any other agency of the American goverrjnent.
"Business", remarked the Charleston

not care how the Soviet Government
Th2 Now

York Jcurn"^! of Commrro^

.

Hews
cam>e

-^nd

"'"^'^

C^^^rier "does

into power."

"

urging that Am.erica

should take advantage of the opportunities offered by the

Soviet markets, added, "We are not likely to do so in the

fullest degree, so long as our Goverfvment insists that no
such thing exists as Soviet Russia."

realistic attitude to
166.
167.
168.
169.

Lit or-irv Direst
Ibid
.

Tb5d.

IMl.

.

v/hat,

16q
'

This call for a

after all, was now an established

August 1?, 1929»PP.8-9

(

-US-

fact of life, coupler] with tho fact that the oconoinic

nituntion did not nllov/

Airiorlca

tho luxury of oolocting

itn trading:: pnrtnorn, f;rontly roflucod tho

f

fToctivonosB

of the opponnntn of rccofipnitiont
To

of

;;;.'iiiy

bur;

t

extent did tho pro-roco^^itl on nttitudon

wh'i t

iiur.LjiMQn

fhi.Mnciora inriuoncc AMmi

niicl

policy in tho question of tho Covic
difl'icult
i^rcat.

It

r;pocific,

b)
h:i'i

L

nj

i;

trnti on

Union? While it is

tho potential influence appeared

domonntratod that Amorican-Soviot trade

b'Tii

could flourish and expand without nf^vernrr.ontal nanctionn.
V/hat

might it not do with tho confidence or tho Adrniniatrat-

ion rnd With

Iho cornfortinc Knov/Loilr.o

that diplomatic nasiot-

ance might bo called in to !3orvo in an omorKoncy? To Incrcrmo

public receptivity of

roco,";nitl on,

Ruarjia ho,";:m to npponrj

l:h(>r.c

:;

Li-(

:'rLlclou on

."^^cnornl

inany

:::;cd

of the problcma

faced by bunincsamon which hopol'ully v/ould bo eradicated
by official rococni tion.
and in

Ft;»y tu] >o

couTcfui

WUtoCvj o?

.

end of Worlfl War

In

tlio

Two cuch articlea appeared in Arlii*

former, William

C.

V/hitc

Ailhi,

a

Sovict-AmoricMn trade rclationn from the
T,

covorln,"; tho part

played by Amtorr

cmphaaizinr: tho Soviet need for Americnn credl

170.

produced

November, 1930, vol.XXX, pp.

t-j.

7'l7-75'»-.

nnd

Wlilto

recorded credits as moct "vital and conplicatod in the
I

whole field of Soviet-AmGrican
that

80fo

relaticnc.

"'"^-^

He added

of all orders placed by Amtcrg were on a credit

basis, and that the

terir.n

of credit varied considerably.

Ho declared that inanuf ncturers v/cro finding it difficult
to sell to the U3SR,

partly from uncertainty about the

security of the Soviet economic system and partly "because
of a lacl: of some foirm of American recognition.

writer

the Fo^t'^^e article

'of

v;as

concerned

"''"'^'^

The

v;ith v/hat

he described as American ignorance about the Soviet Union.

The journal considered it had a responsibility tc over-

come the recurrent "waves and winds of mdsconception"

surrounding the Soviet Union. In an effort to overcome
the "ignorance cor.plex",

several articles followed, variou

ly titled "The Soviet State", the "Russian Peasant", and
the "Five Year Plan".

Liberally interspersed with photo-

graphs and vivid illustrations of Soviet posters, the

articles

v/ere

devoted to the explosion of the current

American myths,

"'"'^-^

A further means of attracting attention

to the recognition issue was to publicise the difficulties

being experienced at this time by
171.
172.
173.

Xb;j
Ibjd
Fortune . March 1932f pp.

A.ratorg.

THe company's

,
.

57-90f

125-130.

)

chiGf problem, of cource,

roportod that

vras

of creditG.

thr.t

v/herea!? Ei^rop^anc wgtg

offering

It was
?.2~J0

month

credit to the Soviet Union, many American firmn offered

only

6

months. It was inferred that if official recognition

took place, American financicro v;ould

offer favcra1:lG and competitive credits
v;as

more v;illing to

Ic-.

.

Non-rccogniticn

beginning to have far-reaching ccncequoncec, particul,

arly in
an.d

frrom

tv7o

areas.

a sluggish

Firct, lack of official reasGurahce

economy prevented many American businessmen

even entering US-rsSR commerce, let alone providing

adequate credits for Soviet traders. Second,
ion of the first) Amtorg

was unable to maintain 'its

previous levels of business. 1931
pov;er from $88,

(and a ref]ect~

-Jiw a

'100,000 to $'1-8,500,000;

Amtorg* c staff was cut back by

1

-

drop in purchasing
in an econom.y m.ove,

7h
'

S^fj,

Professor Robert Erov/der has argued that economic
concerns wore not the primary m.otive behind Am.erican reccg-

nition of the Soviet Union, in Novcm.ber, 1933."

He has

atated that Russia had a greater desire for political than
economic relations and that it was fundamentally concerned

with political recognition by the USA, although it used trade

:i

175.

1931; Nov*- 18, 1931.
r^ir-.ir^r, of r^vi-'-'-^r^r^ rn r^ p3plpry:?.?v
(New Jorsoyi Princeton University Press, 1953.

NYT.

26,
R.P.Brov.'der,
Sc-ot.
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as

B.

v/eapon.

The impetus for Russian overtures to the United

States, according to Erov/der,

v/as

the Japanese entry into-

Manchuria. This dcveloprient, he declared, made the Soviet

Union seek political

^'-""^'"'"ohc.r.T'nt

v.'ith

the United States

with an urgency trade could not produce. And what of the

Americans? Here Professor Erowdcr has maintained that
United States' "businessmen reached the peak of interest
in econoiTiic relations only at the end of the period,

when the depression deepened and Soviet orders declined.
Furthermore, he has pointed out that the high hopes

fostered by the business community for increased trade
were delusions} the anticipated commercial expansion

with Russia did not come.
It is true that, on the eve of recognition,

political and diplomatic considerations did supersede
those of trade, particularly in governmental circles.
Hov;over^ interest in American-Soviet trade had been sus-

tained and increased, as Professor Erov;der has indicated,
through the years 1930-1933. The domination of political
and diplomatic factors arose because it became obvious,

especially to concerned American businessmen, that only
176. liiid.

-119-

be ncanc of formal recognition could the nunicrouG credit

and la^s^l probleir.s "arising from American-Scviet trade be
colvcd. It iz alao true that the expected curge in United

States* exports to the Soviet Union did not materialiee.

On the other hand, the b'JcinesG conmunity thought that
exports- would undoubtedly increase and that rceogi^ition
vrauld

further this end. Merely because American industrial-

ists and financiers may have been over-optirdstic in their

estimates of potential Russian trade, it does not follow
that their arguments for recognition were any lees telling
at the time.

Official recognition of the Soviet Union may
.not a curse.
have proved a mixed blessing, but surely it was

main motive
If it is difficult to establish trade as the

behind recognition, American business interests

v/ere ne^/e^H^e^t<^.

document..
well attended to in the terms of the final
reached between the
For example, a trade agreement was
were extended to
two countries in 1935. Tariff reductions

agreed to purchase $30,000,
the Soviet Union, which in turn
States in 1936. The
United
the
from
goods
of
worth
000
its renewal up to 19^0,
success of this agreem^ent led to
to $^0,000,000 after 1937.
and the guaranteed sum rose

^

These

cuTTis

v;ero

much Iczz than

thoc^c.

of the early thirties,

and indeed, T.uoh lees th^n prcclicte^, but r-^rVn-- +v
I

vvac to

be expected.

Both countries now dealt with each- other

on a different level and both deerned it prudent to
progress

cautiously. Apart from this, the recent dumping and embargo

crisis had created much ill feeling and, consequently,

had di;:located trade.

It would take time for businessmen

of both countries to regain their confidence.

And in time,

advances were made. In 1937 the United States overtook

Germany as first exporter to the Soviet Union. Thus, recurrent
American fears of German infiltraticn into the Russian

market

v;ere

dispelled. As for A.mtcrg, preparations

for its

enlargement were under way only one month after President
Roosevelt had made his agreer.ent with Maxim Litvinov,
Soviet Foreign Minister. Plans

v.'ore

also made to resume

publication of the monthly periodical,
Industry

?^nd

Trn-^e

in Kursia

.

benefit of Am.erican exporters.

Cet-^l^.-u-^^

of Amerieen

produced by Amtorg for the
177

Much of this progress

v/as

made possible by official recognition: the Soviet promise

contained an agreement to cease revolutionary propaganda
in the United States, and an agreement to discuss a debt

settlement.

177.

lilT,

In return, the United States granted dc

Dec.

3»

1-933.

jnrs.

-Ill-

recognition to the Soviet Union. Treaties could now be made,
and r^rcenientG reached on ccor.oriic and trading matters
v/hich v/ere to

"be

of mutual benefit.

XVJL-

ThG Amoric-n bucinDGs community

the period 19l7~l933t

,

throughout"

resardod the Soviet Union v;ith

ambivalence. In the realm of finance and commerce, its
aim had been to explore and exploit a Rncsian market

predicted to be of rich potential. In so doing, businessmen
and bankers hoped to oust European countries, especially
Germany, from their preferred trading positions with the

Soviet Union. These aims were maintained, despite initial

American confusion about, and subsequent abhorrence of,
the Bolshevik revolution.
I917f

In the two decades fcllov/ing

the Bolsheviks, particularly Trotsky, v/ere presented

in business papers and journals as "bogey-menV, Bolshevism

itself was regarded as essentially evil and a mienace to
Yi'estern

capitalism and democracy as a whole and to the

^

American versions in particular. And these attitudes rarely
chnnged, despite the grudging respect of American business

for the Five Year Plans and the desire for increased trade

during the depression years. In many respects, the increased
personal contact wrought by the technical assistance
program, reinforced these attitudes.

^1 O

^

In hictorical ar.rilyGiG

.it

i^:

beet to

or.it

that

kind of adjectival qv.alif ication that makes everything goodcr

"badi

blaC': cr v/hite.

This hov;evor was not alv;ayn FosGible

at the tir.c and hardly to to expected. Nev.Tpaper:^ are largely

unccneerned

v.'ith

hicterical analysis and

cot.s

of the epinicns

cxprecced appear, in retreepcet, entirely euhjective, Mereover,

many of the event e of the period, eepecially the Rusr:ian

rcvolutionc and the ccono.iic dcprccirion

v.'sre

cataclyemic

in their effects and produced "or.trcmefs" of reaction. Ncvor-

thelesG, r.nny bueinces article:':, particularly those of the
jlcillirjilj

v;ere

ecrentially objective. Suslnese editors and

r.agaslnc v/riterc v;cre every bit as hard-headed

and realistic

as the nembcrs of the cerrr.ereial errr.r.unity they quoted or
v;rote
hov;

about.

the American businessmen could mahe more money. Hence

their columns
ted,

The writers v;ere all primarily interested in

v;ere

mere ccmmiercially, than politically, orien-

and ;jeumalists or.erted every effort to promote American-

Soviet traae.
It is possible now to say that many of the fears

and doubts of the business com.m.unity towards Soviet Russia
of
were unfounded. But this can only be seen in the light
time; not during the actual event.

However, it must be

I

p.clniittod

thr.-*:

only Intcr-

rnort biir5.n'?rrncn wr.ro prol^i'b?. y

estod In the poll tied uphc:;.7nlc of tho timo ar they

affcctod
v;e.<xj

Thic.

often not crtrricd through tc

and v/hy one hsr

or

and firsnnce.

cor.ri'jrco

f-r^quo].

c(u\ t.0

I'^ol"

rcpcrto

v/hy

naticfactory concl'.icion

a

rlrcv/hcro f'^r ths rocultc of,

one pnrticul^r ritory, Ono corcluDion that

to,

drr.'.vn

*"o

may explain

frcr. thin

titudy in that trado,

itn cxtcnnion

attitudcn of the

and profitr, v/nf the tanc

frciri

tunincEin con-.niunity of

Vnitcd ritatcc were formed*

In i:hin period
"n:Ti<-.

,

-'he

lip nervico

v;hich the

v.'ar

ricanicn" and th? horrorc of

thoro

ir.ay

have tocn

ir.rry

vt.o

'

wnc profitoL"'c,

"bolnhcvir.;:n"

i

although
An

alec telicvcd then:.

turrinanciman' c reaction

avcr:.£;c

paid to tho idcalr of

v.-ai't

that if tho Rucnian market

if dnbtn wore honcrod and contracts fair,

politics could tc left to the politicinnr; (and the nev.-npaporr)
while ho undertool: commerce to the bciocVLt of both ecimtries.
And thin

v/an

well undorctood at tho time.

accurately erphasinec the point.
ILU;o;ii

,

and pictured

in

rcfurinc a

cj

r

'

A

t eppcared

cartoon
in

tlio

LiliJriiLry

hostile "Uncle Sam"

Kc on which wan written "Dolshevicm"

.

When it

decorated with
wan returned to him covered with icing ond

-125-

the word "trade"! he brightened considerably,

put it dovm,

I

Eumm.ed up the

may change my mind.

"

saying: "J"ust

The caption underneath

underlying meaning of the cartoon with the

words, "Cake looks better v;hon

Communist traders

v;ere

it*s

frosted.

"^"^^

In short,

regarded as businessmen first, and

Communists second, and were judged according to the rules
of the trade.

178.

T,i

ter.-^r\-

Direst

*

August 17, 1929t

p. 8-9.

(

1900

10,000,000

1910

18,000,000

1912

23,000,000

1913

26,000,000

191

31,000,000

/J.

61,000,000

1915
1916

310,000,000

1917

558,58'i'»ooo

V/nll

Stror.

{:

/-nn-n.-i

^

Soptcmbor

U,

191'/)

8
1

1

A£E£IffiIXJL__

(From .Mnun l for Sovi f^t.-Ame rican Trnd i|]jr, ed.
John E. Felber, publ. International Intertrade

Index

)

Amgypt^pf,, tracle

5?

of Total
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1913
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1924

42.1

1925

68.9

1926
1927

20.

Tr.qdfi.

Imnorts

1.1

1.2

0.9
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13.

1.4

0. 3

49.9

14.

1.0

0.3

64.9

12.8

1.3

0.3
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14.0
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0.3

1929

•84.0
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1.6
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1925
1926
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1927
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13.8

1929
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1931

15.8
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"9
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B.8

^^^-^
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'^5

16.3

3.2

19.9
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20.8

:
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16.2
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ll^-**
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1932

"£?^Pg r.t?

1

.

3.0

,.8

7.2
1933
imports of the
-Exports of one country do not always equal
reporting and slight
other country due to time lags in
differences in custom appraisals.

M^^.^f^t>l^HiLg??3-rin

I nfQnn n.tion

Bureau,

ex- President Theodore Roosevelt.

Edward

Hurleys

N.

Chairman of the United States Shipping
Board.

Dr.

N.r.1.

LawTence
C. A.

Butler.

Abbottt editor of Outlook

F.

Coffin!

Darv/in P.Kingsley

t

Samuel McRoberts

:

.

head of General Electric Company."
president of New York Life Insurance Co.
executive manager of the National City
Bank.

Charles

H,

Sabin

t

president of Guaranty Trust Co.

Jacob- Schiff

Oscar Strauss

(

Gcorr^ Kennani
nOO
^
-> -3

:

chairman of New York Public Service
Commission.

Th::

T^ocislon

Intgrvone (Princeton,

1'958)
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M£ r.]

?,

g r;:

<?r

tli

o

Ai]3

m.C rm:::EiiS£iarL_Ch amber
-

Reeve Schley

of Commerc^fi.

vice-president of Chase
National Bank and of Consolidated Coppermines Company.

E.Chappell Porter

executive secretary

,

formerly

director of the N.Y. office of
Federal Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce.

Samuel McRoberts

executive manager of National

City Bank.

Darwin

P.

president of New York Life

Kin{rsley

Insurance Company.

Sabin

president of Guaranty Trust Co,

A.Barton Hepburn

chairman, Chase National Bank's

Charles

H.

Board of Directors.

president of First National

Donald G.Win'r

Bank of Boston.

£i-nnf?

repres ented incliid M«

Kidder, Peabody and Co.,

International Fur Exchange

Deere and Co.

International Harvester

,

National Carbon Co.,

Lucey Manufacturing Co.,

Shawmut National Bank

American Locomotive Co.,

Guaranty Trust Co.,

International General Electric

Worthin^rton PumD Co.

,

Co.

,

Russian SinfTer Co.,

Westinghouse Air Brake Co.,

Mercantile Trust Co.,

American Car and Foundry.

(rrincoton, I958)
(

Antony Sutton,
(

v/n-^-^ovv^

fP.^oVv^r^^

Ca?.ifornia, I968)

^y,^

r-.^,..^^

Errr^-^iA
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APPENDIX

E.

Ito]2ar.n_a£_yi£_£^2JPldJ^

Robert F.Maddox

on

Coinillg rce

and My^rinP

.

president of the American Bankers'

Association and Atlanta National
Bank,

Lewis E.Pierson

chairman of the Irving National
Bank, New York City,

Charles

Sabin

E.

president of the Guaranty Trust
Company,

John McHugh

vice-president of the Mechanics
•

Donald.G, Wing.

.

and Metals National Bank, N,Y,C.

president of First National Bank,
Boston.

Arthur Reynolds

vice-president, Continental and

Commercial National Bank, Chicago.

William

A.

I-aw

president of the First National
Bank, Philadelphia,

F,0.

president of the Third National

Watts

Bank, St. Louis.

Charles H.Hinsch

president of the Third National
Bank, Cincinnati,

Thomas

B.

McAdams

vice-president of the Merchants
National Bank, Richmond.

John E. Borden, Jr.,

president of the Whiney-Central
National Bank, New Orleans.

James J.Fagan

vice-president of the Crocher
National Bank, San Francisco,

Rohort N.Karpor

pronidont of
National

John

L.

Hamilton

t\\Q
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prccidont of

DiBLrlot

Wash., D.C.

tlic

Americnn

Guaranty Company, Columbun

Senator Joncph Franco, of Maryland.

(

v'ni}

-t ^nnt .>vrr-l

,

January

2;?,

1.919.)

(Source: S.Bron, ^9y^i^:l^nr^Lc^B2LS.ljQmpJlL^^
Bilgln£^^t p.

58)

Ford Motor Company

General Motor Corporation

Studebaker Motor Company

Willys-Knight Company
Nash Corporation

Standard Oil of New York

Texax Oil Company
Bucyrus -Erie Conpany

Sullivan Machinery Company

Foster Wheeler Corporation

Caterpillar Tractor Company
Cleveland Tractor Company
International Harvester Company

Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company
Dwight

P.

Robinson and ComDany

Morison Steam Shovel Company

Austin Company
International General Electric Company

National City Bank
Chase National Bank

Equitable Trust Company
United States National Bank.

^

-13'-!-

PIBLIOCPAPHY

:

1

*i

>

m.^

'.Voys

end Means,

3rd.

SGCcion, on

of St::tc,
*

-

^ y

t

—

Report

"by

-

.

^

,

...

I6035

.-^

I.ecnard J.

D,C.t
.

Lcv/ery,

w ^ —#

Nnticn'

i_

-~

'

c

F\ir:inor-n.

.

^-

--

^

--N- *

^

-

,

19^^S.

...

^

AcniGtant Chief, Eastern
Cor.ir.eroe,

of tho A^cr^c;-n Acndcmv of PoMticnl

A'T^o-..

I93I).

GovcrraGnt Printing Of f ice

European Division, Department of
Govcrnn-mt Printing Office, 1923*

AnnzLlr?

20 ar.d 21,

(?el:rv.?.ry 19,

Governi?cnt Printir.s Office, I93I.

t

'.','ashington
—

-

«

H. R,

D.C.

V,'ashin:X"ton,

^

...in 9

nnri

Washington, D.

C,

Soci.nl ?cirn S£.

j

-

•

No rth

/

ii

Ufc

I

I.

hr^u ^^-U^-^r

iL,

.1

fir. r^^

J-

.

.1.

'
i

-

I

V* •

Bailey »

fiii.i^tuj-

II

''"r„

r

T.

n r-vl-n-/ .

A

'

ihtj

»«'

^
i

U

•

^

Ar.^cg:.:

fr.ccr;

Riir nln.:R\i nr3 ^ri-J^-^r^tlsD^lJ^JlLnlz

irj::iJim-S2rl:/^iIlirj^iLj^^
Cornc'3,1

Nov.'

University

Yorkj

r.^vj

--r. ^

r-v^

fp v,.,^^r.

E

,

.

r

1

11':':'::^^'

Poli cy

D.n

V/altham,

Dldiifride] !

Publ

Mew Yorki Cyracuc-e University

19^^ 5.

y.'^ot^yo.y/

. r.l

BontoTij

B ro n ,

Mnf.rja

1970.

GyrncuLJc,

o\'j .

Prcnc,
J

Ar.LiLiljLaiLjrjiLTl^

Illi2_Ii2i2i::^viiI^

v\

D 1 inn ,

lYincetoni Princeton

Ari,

Dilci".rn :i.

lo'l-?.

I9'l6.

[Lo:]

ichln^- Company,
B i nho p,

^

i

1950.

The r"acmil]an Cori^prny,

Un3vcrr:ity Prorjn,

Donne t r

Prcn^;,

i -bh a c a

^

n^n

Litt-lc,

o o v 3 o t l^nor^in ic

G

the Po]

:

]'.rnv/n

YrTT

PI pn,

'.icr;.

o f r^r.jJ.ljty.

and Coinpany, 195^'

^^vo lopin'-' n t. and Am c'r lcpn
the F j rrt Yon r u nder tho

Biirlr ior^itPecultr

F3 VP

i

^

9?0

.

Nov/

Yorki Horace Livericht,

1930.

Browdcr,

R.

P

Th

^'

n^^-•1nr^' of r-viot

-t..r^r-rizziiJ:)21^2.S:]LDSiy.t

Princotont Princeton Univorcitiy Prcnn, 1953*

-136-

Budish,J.M.

and'

S.S,,.,

Ship;iinn,

Soviet

^n-y-r>,i r-^

mv,^^^

Yorks Hora.ce

^

Liveri^^ht Inccrpcratcd,

Carr» E. H

»

#

.

.

The T^vi

Nov; York!

A

•

YLi

Tr^^^r»-t-

r>i-

t^-~

^-'.-v

Ccvlot

-'-^Vf

T^'A-^i-^t

T^l^-^^"?.

Macmillan

Nev;

t.j^^T

T' .r

Polrhrvik

York: The

I952-I953.

Coripar.y,

A

T"?

.Ho\:?e Incorporated,

Condoide, W.V.

-<tov>-r.

The Macmillan Conpany, 19'!?.

Rr^vo^vt

Clark?on, J.D

r^v^

I93I.

^

yo rk

R ar.

:

oni

I963.

?unc?.^n-,^-?ri^r^ ^r-^d?f Columbus, Ohio

The

j

Euroau of Eusrinoss Research, Col]e2:n of Cor.mcrce and Adniini ctraticn, Ohio Ctate University,
DubofG]'.y,

K

:!9'l6,

V^hcn VJorko^s Orr:anise

.

Amhcrrit, Tiass.

ersity of Massachusetts,
c«j;><.-Xf

Atvaatfttfttt^ft

*

^

^

-

York
Felbcr; J.E.

V

^

J

r^r^nual

-^^

^

,.-

.
,

^

.

-

^-1*

r*--^

-1

3

:

Univ-

968,
V -

^

r-u

Ji.y

_

Viking Press, I96O.
for ^^viet-.^-^-vie'?n "^rariir-

*

Now

Jersey: International Interstate Index, I967.
th^ T^viet

X9ir-

Filcno, P

A^.eric-^nr

Fischer, L

i£33i Cair.bridge, Kassi Harvard University
Press, 1967.
RM c^-j-.'s ^----^ frrr, V^nC^ to Wn^-t Soviet

nv^ri

Foroi.^. Polntion?,

^

^

^

^

E::p<--riTiient.

191.7-1.9^11 .

New York:

Harper and Pov/, I969.
The Soviets in ^'/orld Affrirs;"^ history
relations botv.'een the Soviet Union and the
rest of the world, lot 7-19^^9 Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1951-.
.

•

0

^

.

-137-

Fi cch0r » L

""•;

^•

''ncry";:''

/

^

th^

r -^^rr-t

pyi

•~!

^^

•

^

^^^^rri

Ar /?.''!r!'''r

7

-';j/-n

of

t ho

pr r.r.cnt bv tho n^ it^^l ^-^ntor.

fry-

S oviet

-rr}

rny-

Nov/ Yorlcj

Jonathar. Cape and llarricon Smith, 1931.

Ford,

r.v

II

Lifo

"'n-V

nn-1

and Company,
Vr/ Vhi'}.

^

r,o

/^.'•'"ric-

Knopf,
Gcrr;hcn^cron,

A

19-^1-.

cf

];hy

I^-^^^

r-trv!

i

A

q-'"

"^?ri:'n

Londoni Ceor^je Harmr^, I929.

rV'Tirotc

Fricdcl, F.D

Yorki Doublcday, Face

Mcv;

,

-'n

:

3

thn

T'"^'nt^ otl-i

Cor'tr;?;-;;

..

Nov.'

York!

9(''5.

V'^.^^.-TArn

IV'lni-.^ ott-

on International

v;:

th

•^i

nr;^P, ConTnittoe

:?

^''("•onorilc

Policy in coopor-

ation with the Carnccio EndowTncnt for Internationa 1 Peace,

Kennan

,

G. F

19'^5«

"'^vi?^:-^--rl? r.n P^l-ti^n-.
Pvr'i'ilr!

Icrv/on

In'-^rv^nc

.

''/"i

and

^"

Princeton

^i'

l

o-i

h

'.?

7-10^-0 .0 yo 1 1c^

c

'
"!
,

ion

.

»

"('

Princctcn Univorcity

t

Prcnn, 1956tl-958.

La 0 c h C
,

'."V.r.

A:!'/jrlc rn

:.ib-:r? 2 r

:i

nd

1; ] i::-IiL i
:

r:r i:: r^

n::iiz

olulion. No\y.„yorki Columbia Univcrcity Prccsi
1962.

Lcuchtcnburr, W

Por>^T-

rro-T^eritv.

1

91 ^!-.l9.32.

Chicac:o IJnivcrcity Preen,

Lo vcncto 1 n, M

Chicago

1

1958*

Wanh inr.ton

AniilIlii:^in_C^

D.C., American Council on Public Affaire,

Murray, R.K

Rod Sca re
1920.
1955.

.

a

f;tudy in

nationa l

h:tiatcria,

I9'l1

t

.

1919-

Mineapoli:;: Univorcity of Minnesota' Preen,

*

Mevins J
1 1 *
Ft
iiX-LJ-f

and

A.

^
X

•

f

•

9

«

6

>

•

«

•

*

«

t

t

)

^y^r^

"^r
*
^

>

,

ir.r-,^^-^

^

t t
1

;

v^

--

1

of ^,.1 n

^

i

,

f

Charles Ccribner'c Sonsj 1957,

Nev/ Yorl^j

..A Histo ry of

Pares, B

v

^-^a

w

.......

Pii^ni.-^y

New

Ycrl::

Alfred Kncpf,

1952.

Schlesin^or, Jri A.M.

•

-

"^hn

A^

C^^-'^ir.^

^^-^

^.

^_oo?'^v^]. +

of tho

2

N^"r "Pool

volsg Th^

o^i.rlr^

Boston: Houghton

.

Mifflin, 1957-1958,

New York

J

Macmillan, 1955.

?ir?o th^ -iQoQt^^ Chicago, Rand McNally,
1963.
•

••»«••«••••

f

*

•

.

Tho

C''>:;'0'^-1'

D^'^'^rer'rrioni

Nev/

Jcrceyj Prentice**

Hall, i960.
Poft.Tonvj

t^'^

Wn-rr*:

Housh-ton Mifflin,

Soulc

,

G...,

Amo-TT on

1

01 o-io/ii

Eoston:

I965.

£n!i£ii2rii;iJ:.'i£^^

1Q17--1^^9 « New York, Rinehart,
Su-tton,

.

19^^7.

^ny^^t Y.Q^rrr.iQ
Ca-lifornia: Hoover
Dev^lorr-'^nt. 1917-:' 930
Institute Publications, Stanford University

vjn---n-rr>^

A.C

^nf-hn-^lor-^ -^v^

.

Press,

Thomson,
Harti R,

A.VJ.

1968.

and
The Uncertain Cr^^-adc, Amherst, l^lassi University of Massachusetts Press, 1970.

,

-13'?-

lli^t^rv of

Vernadcl:yt C

l^-^--:'',.-^

Ur.TVGrrlty Prcns,
V/ i

1 1 i nw. G ,

V,'

A

.

A>T^^r5 c-^r-R^ir—i nr.

Haven: Yale

ricv;

I967.
P.o],?t,i o nr,

1781.-1. o^>7 .

Now York: Rinehart, 1952.

Pi,v.i

'^-^•^-

^

Infcrr^t.lon Sc^'vicp

^.'rc

The
^

»

k

Tr>

p»

-p

V/ho

11

I

o "r^

»

I

."^

V^pr

^

r»

I

h

I

1

1

•

H.V/,

.

od.

L,

llcnloy.

New Yorl,

Wilson Company^ 1918.

.1

""^1

r
^

in

Arn^^"!?-".!

Chicago, Illinois: The
CoiTipany,

19'!3.

A. N.

Marquis

